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Note
Dillon v. Evanston Hospital:
Illinois Adopts the New Increased Risk Doctrine
Governing Recovery for Future Injury
Kira Elert*
A tortfeasor should not get off scot-free because instead
of killing his victim outright he inflicts an injury that is
likely though not certain to shorten the victim's life.
-Judge Posner in DePass v. United States1
1. INTRODUCTION
During Diane Dillon's treatment for breast cancer at a local hospital,
her doctor implanted a sixteen centimeter-long catheter tube in her chest
so that he could better administer chemotherapy. 2 When the treatment
was completed, however, the doctor accidentally removed only seven
centimeters of the catheter, leaving the rest in Dillon's chest.3 A chest
x-ray taken at a subsequent check-up failed to reveal the catheter
fragment, and doctors did not discover it until one year later, when the
* J.D. expected May 2004. This Note could not have been completed without the advice and
assistance of my husband, Ross M. Kwasteniet. I would also like to thank my family and friends
for their love and support, especially my mother, who has learned more than she ever wanted to
know about Illinois tort law. In addition, thanks to Loyola's Professor Henry Rose for his help in
selecting a topic and for providing advice and information along the way. Finally, I am extremely
grateful to the hard-working editors of the Lovola University Chicago Law Journal for their
endless patience and insightful comments.
1. DePass v. United States, 721 F.2d 203. 208 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., dissenting); see also
infra notes 243-66 (discussing the DePass decision).
2. Dillon v. Evanston Hosp., 771 N.E.2d 357, 361 (I1. 2002); see also infra Part III.A
(discussing the facts of Dillon). A catheter is a "flexible tube inserted into a body cavity, duct, or
vessel to allow fluids to pass." AM. HERITAGE COLL. DICTIONARY 222 (3d ed. 1997). In
Dillon's case, the catheter provided doctors with a means of drawing blood and administering
chemotherapy throughout the course of the breast cancer treatment in order to avoid repeatedly
inserting needles into Dillon's veins. Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 361.
3. Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 361. Dillon sued the catheter's manufacturer, Davol, Inc., as an
additional defendant in this case, but the jury found that Davol was not responsible for Dillon's
injury. Id.
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fragment had migrated, embedding itself in Dillon's heart.4 Because it
was too risky to remove the catheter fragment, Dillon was forced to
leave it in place.5  As a result, Dillon faced several possible medical
risks, none of which were certain to occur, but which nevertheless
caused her concern. 6
When Dillon sued her doctor for medical malpractice, she sought
compensation not only for pain and suffering, but also for the increased
risk of future complications from the catheter fragment. 7  A jury
awarded Dillon what she asked for: damages for her pain and suffering
and for her increased risk of developing future injuries. 8
The defendants in Dillon v. Evanston Hospital9 appealed to the
Illinois Supreme Court the issue of whether a plaintiff could be allowed
to recover for the "increased risk"'10 of an injury, especially one that was
not reasonably certain to occur."1 The court unanimously decided that
an increased risk, even one that is not likely to occur, is compensable. 12
The Illinois Supreme Court's decision overturned more than ninety
years of precedent. 13
This Note will focus on traditional and emerging standards used in
evaluating damages for the increased risk of future injuries. Part II of
this Note will explain what "increased risk" is and examine a typical
4. Id. At the time of trial, the tip of the fragment was embedded in the wall of Dillon's right
atrium, while the rest of the fragment was floating free inside her heart. Id.
5. Id.; see also infra note 279 and accompanying text (providing the doctors' rationale as to
why it would be more dangerous to remove the fragment than to leave it in place).
6. Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 366; see also infra notes 284-85 and accompanying text (discussing
and defining the risks Dillon faced by leaving the fragment in her heart).
7. Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 366.
8. Id. at 361-62; see also infra Part III.B (discussing the jury verdict).
9. Dillon v. Evanston Hosp., 771 N.E.2d 357, 361 (Ill. 2002).
10. "Increased risk" refers to the heightened chance of an injury occurring in the future
because of a defendant's negligence. See United States v. Anderson, 669 A.2d 73, 75 (Del. 1995)
("As its name implies, the increased risk doctrine provides that a person may recover damages if
the person's risk of suffering a negative medical condition is increased because of medical
malpractice."); see also infra notes 22-24 and accompanying text (giving an example of a
situation in which the plaintiff faces an increased risk).
11. Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 366. The standard before the Dillon case was that an increased risk
could not be compensated unless it was "reasonably certain" to occur. Id. at 366-67; see also
infra notes 35-38 and accompanying text (discussing the traditional Illinois standard governing
the recovery for increased risk); infra Part II.C.1 (discussing the cases that established this
standard in Illinois). For the purposes of this Note, "reasonably certain" refers to a greater than
50% likelihood of a future injury occurring.
12. Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 368-70. Although Chief Justice Harrison dissented in part, he
agreed with the court that an increased risk should be compensated. Id. at 373 (Harrison, C.J.,
dissenting); see also infra Part III.D (discussing Chief Justice Harrison's dissent).
13. Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 366-68; see also infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text
(discussing the state of the law in Illinois prior to Dillon).
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situation in which it is likely to occur. 14 Next, Part II will explore the
traditional standard that Illinois, along with most other jurisdictions,
applied to the recovery for increased risk.15 Part II will further discuss
the rationale behind this traditional standard, as well as some of the
problems that it potentially creates. 16  Next, Part II will discuss the
methods that Illinois courts and other jurisdictions have created in order
to avoid some of these possible problems. 17 Finally, Part II will explore
the division that existed among Illinois appellate courts over the issue of
"increased risk." 18  Part III of this Note will discuss the holding in
Dillon v. Evanston Hospital, which settled the division in the Illinois
appellate courts by making a full retreat from the traditional standard
applied to increased risk cases. 19 Part IV will explain why the Dillon
decision to withdraw from the traditional rule was correct.20 Finally,
Part V will discuss the potential impact of the Illinois Supreme Court's
decision on future increased risk cases.
21
II. BACKGROUND
Imagine that a plaintiff is involved in an auto accident and his leg has
to be amputated as a result of another driver's negligence. 22  At trial,
medical doctors testify that, as a result of the amputation, the plaintiff
has a 44% increased risk of dying from heart disease.23 This plaintiff
should certainly be able to recover for his medical expenses and past
and future pain and suffering that results from the leg amputation, but
14. See infra notes 22-27 and accompanying text (describing a hypothetical example of an
increased risk situation and the questions that it raises).
15. See infra Part I.A (explaining the traditional approach to the recovery of future damages,
dubbed the "all-or-nothing" rule).
16. See infra Part H.A.1 (identifying the major reasons for the original adoption of the
traditional all-or-nothing rule); Part II.A.2 (analyzing the potential problems caused by the all-or-
nothing rule).
17. See infra Part II.B (describing the different methods courts have used in order to try to
avoid the perceived inequities of the all-or-nothing rule).
18. See infra Part I.C (tracing the emergence of the increased risk doctrine in Illinois courts
before Dillon).
19. See infra Part III; see also infra Part III.A (providing the facts of Dillon); infra Part III.B
(providing a brief procedural history of the lower courts' findings); infra Part III.C (describing
the decision of the majority of the Illinois Supreme Court); infra Part III.D (giving a synopsis of
Chief Justice Harrison's partial dissent).
20. See infra Part IV (arguing that the increased risk doctrine is superior to the all-or-nothing
rule).
21. See infra Part V (analyzing the impact of Dillon on increased risk cases, especially the
potential effect on both loss of chance and toxic tort cases).
22. See DePass v. United States, 721 F.2d 203 (7th Cir. 1983). This hypothetical is based on
the facts of DePass. See id. at 203-06.
23. See id. at 204.
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should he also be allowed to recover for his increased risk of developing
heart disease? 24 Should the analysis be any different if the risk of dying
from heart disease is only 20%? What if the risk is 70%?25 And if he is
awarded damages for this increased risk, how should the damages be
calculated? 26  These questions have divided courts across the country
for several years.27 In Dillon v. Evanston Hospital, the Illinois Supreme
Court revisited the increased risk situation in order to reconcile
divisions that had arisen in the Illinois appellate courts over these same
questions. 2
8
This Part explores the development of Illinois law regarding recovery
for the increased risk of future damages. 29 Part II.A will explain the
traditional view that Illinois, and most other jurisdictions, accepted until
the decision in Dillon.30  Part II.A will then discuss the implications of
this traditional rule, explaining the rationale behind the original
adoption of the rule and its possible limitations. 31 Part II.B will trace
the development of different methods courts have used in order to deal
24. See, e.g., id. at 205-06. In DePass, the majority found that the plaintiff was not allowed to
recover for the increased risk of heart disease. Id.; see also infra notes 243-66 and accompanying
text (discussing the DePass decision).
25. See infra Part II.A (discussing the traditional all-or-nothing rule). Under the traditional
Illinois rule, a plaintiff with less than a 50% chance of incurring the injury for which he has a risk
is unable to recover for that risk. See infra Part II.A. But cf infra Part tI.B.2.c (discussing a new
cause of action that some jurisdictions have adopted, called the increased risk doctrine). Under
the increased risk doctrine, the plaintiff in the hypothetical would be able to partially recover for
the risk of heart disease, so long as he can prove that the defendant proximately caused that risk.
See infra Part II.B.2.c (explaining how to determine damages according to the increased risk
doctrine).
26. See infra Part II.B.2.c (discussing the increased risk doctrine). According to the increased
risk doctrine, a plaintiff will receive damages for a risk of future injury in proportion to how
likely that future injury is to occur. See infra notes 162-65 and accompanying text (describing
how to calculate damages under the increased risk doctrine). Thus, damages are calculated by
multiplying the probability of occurrence by the full amount that the injury would be worth were
it to occur. See infra notes 162-65 and accompanying text (describing how to calculate damages
under the increased risk doctrine).
27. See generally infra Part H.A-B (discussing the traditional all-or-nothing rule to the
recovery for increased risk and some of the solutions different courts have created in order to
remedy the perceived inequities of this approach).
28. Dillon v. Evanston Hosp., 771 N.E.2d 357, 367 (Il1. 2002); see also infra Part III.C.l.a
(describing the majority's discussion regarding the split among Illinois appellate courts).
29. See infra Part IIA-C (discussing the development of Illinois law regarding the recovery
for the increased risk of future damages).
30. See infra Part II.A (analyzing the all-or-nothing rule and its impact on recovery for
increased risk).
3 1. See infra Part II.A. I (discussing the reasoning behind the traditional all-or-nothing rule
and the fears that proponents have about retreating from it); infra Part II.A.2 (explaining the
typical critiques of the traditional rule and the concerns opponents have about adhering to it).
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with certain limitations of the traditional rule.32 Finally, Part II.C will
specifically discuss the application of one of these methods in Illinois
courts before Dillon.33
A. The "All-or-Nothing" Rule
Before Dillon v. Evanston Hospital, Illinois courts applied the
traditional rule, often called the "all-or-nothing rule," 34 to the recovery
for future injuries.35 This rule, adopted in Illinois almost 100 years ago
in Amann v. Chicago Consolidated Traction Co., 36 mandates that a
plaintiff cannot recover for a future injury unless he or she can
demonstrate, to a reasonable certainty, that the injury will occur in the
future. 37 Most courts agree that reasonable certainty requires a finding
32. See infra Part II.B (tracing the development of different methods and new doctrines
created to counteract the perceived negative effects of the all-or-nothing rule).
33. See infra Part II.C (discussing the Illinois cases that established the traditional all-or-
nothing rule and those Illinois cases that allowed the recovery for an increased risk even though it
was not allowed under the traditional rule).
34. See infra note 42 and accompanying text (explaining why this traditional rule has been
called the all-or-nothing rule).
35. Dillon v. Evanston Hosp., 771 N.E.2d 357, 367 (Ill. 2002). Dillon ultimately rejected the
traditional, all-or-nothing rule. See infra notes 315-26 and accompanying text (describing the
Illinois Supreme Court's rationale for rejecting the all-or-nothing rule). Almost all states,
however, still adhere to this rule, at least with respect to recovery for future damages. John D.
Hodson, Annotation, Medical Malpractice: "Loss of Chance" Causality, 54 A.L.R. 4th 10, §§ 2,
4(1987).
36. Amann v. Chi. Consol. Traction Co., 90 N.E. 673 (I11. 1909) (holding that a doctor's
testimony that abrasions suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the defendant's negligence might
worsen the plaintiffs pre-existing paralysis was not to be considered by the jury because it was
mere speculation), overruled by Dillon v. Evanston Hosp., 771 N.E.2d 357 (Ill. 2002). In 1909,
Amann established the all-or-nothing rule in Illinois, which governed the recovery for the risk of
future injury until the Dillon decision in 2002.
37. Amann, 90 N.E. at 674 ("To justify a recovery for future damages the law requires proof
of a reasonable certainty that they will be endured in the future."); see also DePass v. United
States, 721 F.2d 203, 205-06 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that damages should not be awarded for
alleged increased risk of cardiovascular disease and loss of life expectancy because neither was
reasonably certain to occur); Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324, 344 (I11. 1990) (finding
that daughters who were exposed to diethylstilbestrol ("DES") while in utero could not recover
because the risks were too speculative); Stevens v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 137 N.E. 859, 862-63 (Ill.
1922) (finding error when the lower court allowed physicians to testify as to the possible injuries
an x-ray of the plaintiff's head might show but did not show with reasonable certainty); Lauth v.
Chi. Union Traction Co., 91 N.E. 431, 434-35 (I11. 1910) (holding that a plaintiff could not
recover for the possible recurrence of a hernia and the attending possibility of death, allegedly
due to medical malpractice, because the possibility of recurrence was too speculative); Lake
Shore & Mich. S. Ry. v. Conway, 48 N.E. 483, 484 (Il1. 1897) (holding that a plaintiff could
recover for a permanent disability resulting from a railroad accident because the future injury was
reasonably certain to result); Wehmeier v. UNR Indus., 572 N.E.2d 320, 339 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th
Dist. 1991) (finding that evidence of a worker's increased risk of contracting cancer because of
his exposure to asbestos was too speculative and, therefore, did not establish present,
compensable injury); Russell v. Subbiah, 500 N.E.2d 138, 141 (I11. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1986)
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that there is a greater than 50% chance that the injury will occur.38
Thus, if a plaintiff proves that he has a greater than 50% chance of
suffering from an injury at some point in the future, the injury is viewed
as a certainty, and the plaintiff can recover full damages for that
injury. 39 However, if the plaintiff proves only that there is a possibility
that the injury will occur (that is, less than a 50% chance), he is unable
to recover anything, even if that injury does in fact occur after the suit.40
(holding that a doctor's testimony that there was a 50/50 chance that an alleged misdiagnosis of a
spinal cord tumor would cause increased injury to a patient's leg and prolong his recovery period
did not meet the reasonable certainty standard and was, therefore, not compensable); Curry v.
Summer, 483 N.E.2d 711, 718 (Il1. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1985) (holding that the plaintiff could not
recover in a wrongful death action due to negligent misdiagnosis of a severe heart attack because
the decedent's resulting death could not be shown to be proximately related to the original
negligence); Morrissy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 394 N.E.2d 1369, 1376 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1979)
(holding that daughters of mothers given DES while pregnant could not recover for their
heightened risk of contracting cancer or other diseases as a consequence of their exposure to
DES). But see Harp v. I11. Cent. Gulf R.R., 370 N.E.2d 826, 830 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1977)
(holding that the plaintiff could recover for the increased risk of rupturing a vertebral disc as a
result of the original injury because the possible rupture of the disc was reasonably certain to
occur if sufficient force was exerted upon it).
38. Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 367. Although jurisdictions use different standards for determining
whether causation has been established (such as: "in all likelihood," "reasonably certain,"
"reasonably probable," "medically probable," "probable," "reasonable medical certainty," and
"more probable than not"), most jurisdictions require that the plaintiff prove the increased risk is
greater than 50%. David P.C. Ashton, Comment, Decreasing the Risks Inherent in Claims for
Increased Risk of Future Disease, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 108!, 1103-05 (1989); see also Keith W.
Lapeze, Comment, Recovery for Increased Risk of Disease in Louisiana, 58 LA. L. REV. 249, 254
n.35 (1997) (discussing how most jurisdictions use the "but for" test in an increased risk
situation); David Carl Minneman, Annotation, Future Disease or Condition or Anxiety Relating
Thereto, as Element of Recovery, 50 A.L.R. 4th 13, §§ 43-48 (1986) (discussing the confusion
between different standards of proof used by different jurisdictions). "While some cases equate
the term 'reasonably certain' with 'probable,' other cases explicitly distinguish the concept of
,reasonable probability' from the concept of 'reasonable certainty.' However, most cases and
jurisdictions recognize and apply only one of these rules without reference to, or interchanging it
with, the other." Minneman, supra, § 43.
39. Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 367. Recovering full damages means that the plaintiff would
recover as if that injury had actually occurred. Id.; cf infra Parts II.B.2.b.i, II.B.2.c (analyzing
the loss of chance doctrine and the increased risk doctrine where damages are not given in full but
rather are measured by multiplying the probability of occurrence by the "full" amount the injury
is worth).
40. See Joseph H. King, Jr., "Reduction of Likelihood" Reformulation and Other Retrofitting
of the Loss of a Chance Doctrine, 28 U. MEM. L. REV. 491, 499-500 (1998) [hereinafter King,
"Reduction of Likelihood"]; Ashton, supra note 38, at 1095; Lapeze, supra note 38, at 252; see
also Petriello v. Kalman, 576 A.2d 474, 482-83 (Conn. 1990) (discussing the all-or-nothing rule);
Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 367 (discussing the all-or-nothing rule); 2 DAN B. DOBBS, REMEDIES §
8.1(7), at 407 (2d ed.1993) (discussing the calculation of damages under the all-or-nothing rule);
Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving
Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353, 1370-73 (1981)
(discussing damages under the all-or-nothing rule) [hereinafter King, Causation, Valuation, and
Chance].
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In the above car accident hypothetical, the plaintiff would be unable
to recover for his claim of increased risk of heart disease because the
probability of its occurrence is less than 50%.4 1 Many courts and
commentators refer to this traditional rule as the "all-or-nothing" rule
because of its seemingly disparate results.
42
1. Rationale Underlying the All-or-Nothing Rule
Because most jurisdictions still adhere to the all-or-nothing rule, it is
necessary to examine the rationale behind this traditional rule.43  The
main reasons given for adherence to this standard generally fall into two
categories: first, general causation principles deeply rooted in tort law,
and second, policy concerns about the lessening of this traditional
burden. 44
a. Traditional Tort Causation Principles and the All-or-Nothing Rule
Supporters of the all-or-nothing rule point to traditional causation
theory as the basis of the rule.45  In a traditional suit for negligence, a
plaintiff must prove that the defendant's breach of a duty caused the
resulting injury. 46  In the case of an increased risk of injury, the jury
must weigh the evidence presented at trial and determine whether the
41. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text (providing an increased risk hypothetical
wherein a plaintiff suffers a 44% increased risk of heart disease resulting from a defendant's
negligence).
42. Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 368. Critics often refer to the traditional rule as the "all-or-nothing"
rule because a plaintiff will either recover fully for a future injury (if he or she can establish that
the injury is more than 50% likely to occur) or the plaintiff will receive nothing (if there is less
than 50% chance of the injury's occurrence). Id. Thus, many plaintiffs will recover nothing for
an injury that later occurs, while others will be compensated fully for an injury that never occurs.
ld.; see, e.g., Petriello, 576 A.2d at 482-83 (criticizing the "all-or-nothing" rule).
43. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (showing that most states still use the all-or-
nothing rule).
44. See infra Part II.A.L.a (analyzing the main reason proponents give for the adherence to the
all-or-nothing rule: traditional rules of causation); infra Part II.A.l.b (listing some of the policy
concerns behind the all-or-nothing rule).
45. See, e.g., Amann v. Chi. Consol. Traction Co., 90 N.E. 673, 674 (I11. 1909) ("To justify a
recovery for future damages the law requires proof of a reasonable certainty that they will be
endured in the future."), overruled by Dillon v. Evanston Hosp., 771 N.E.2d 357 (Ill. 2002); see
also Wehmeier v. UNR Indus., 572 N.E.2d 320, 335 (I11. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1991) ("Under Illinois
law, a plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
caused the plaintiff harm or injury; mere conjecture or speculation is insufficient proof."). Some
scholars seem to indicate that any uncertainty should render a future injury unrecoverable; "threat
of future harm, not yet realized, is not enough." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 165 (5th ed. 1984).
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328A (1965); see also Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., A
Primer on the Patterns of Negligence, 53 LA. L. REV. 1509, 1510-15 (1993) (describing the
traditional negligence formula).
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defendant probably47 caused the future injury.48 Thus, if there is less
than a 50% chance of the injury actually occurring, the causation
element cannot be met because there is less than a 50% chance that the
defendant caused that injury. 49 Proponents of the all-or-nothing rule
reason that a lesser standard of causation would invite speculation and
conjecture, which are directly in conflict with traditional tort notions of
fairness and justice.50
47. Jurisdictions use different standards, but "probably" seems to connote that the risk is more
than 50% likely to occur. See supra note 38 (describing the different terms of art that are used to
describe "more than 50% likely to occur").
48. King, "Reduction of Likelihood," supra note 40, at 499-500. Under the all-or-nothing
rule, a "victim's claim is viewed exclusively in terms of causation." Id. at 499; see also Shawn
M. Nichols, Note, Jorgenson v. Vener: The South Dakota Supreme Court Declares Loss-of-
Chance Doctrine as Part of Our Common Law in Medical Malpractice Torts, 46 S.D. L. REV.
618, 618-19 (2000-2001) (discussing the traditional burden of proving causation and how it
relates to recovering for future injuries).
49. King, "Reduction of Likelihood," supra note 40, at 499-500; see also Nichols, supra note
48, at 618-19 (noting that a plaintiff must prove that a defendant doctor is "more likely than not"
the cause of the plaintiffs injuries, and noting that "more likely than not" equals at least 51% in
technical legal terms). Proof of causation is often extremely difficult in increased risk situations
because plaintiffs are basically compelled to prove both that there is more than a 50% chance that
the defendant caused the injury and that there is a greater than 50% chance that the injury will
actually occur. See Ashton, supra note 38, at 1095.
50. See Budden v. Goldstein, 128 A.2d 730, 735 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1957), overruled
by Botta v. Brunner, 138 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1958). The Budden court reasoned:
Basically, our view comes down to this: a consequence of an injury which is possible,
which may possibly ensue, is a risk which the injured person must bear because the law
cannot be administered so as to do reasonably efficient justice if conjecture and
speculation are to be used as a measure of damages. On the other hand, a consequence
which stands on the plane of reasonable probability, although it is not certain to occur,
may be considered in the evaluation of the damage claim against the defendant. In this
way, to the extent that men can achieve justice through general rules, a just balance of
the warring interests is accomplished.
Id. at 734. But see Barton C. Legum, Note, Increased Risk of Cancer as an Actionable Injury, 18
GA. L. REV. 563, 568-69 (1984).
Since they cannot show that their potential injuries will in "reasonable probability" or
"reasonable certainty" occur, [those plaintiffs who cannot prove that their future injury
is more than 50% likely to occur] go uncompensated for the risk that they must bear.
Yet plaintiff B with a 40% chance of future damages seems no less deserving of
compensation than plaintiff A with a 60% chance. It is irrational and arbitrary to award
A full compensation for potential damages yet deny B compensation altogether. It is as
if courts are finding that 40% of all tickets in a lottery are absolutely worthless while
60% of the tickets are worth the entire prize.
Id. at 569.
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b. Policy Concerns Fundamental to the All-or-Nothing Rule
Several concerns have arisen over new judicial methods that lessen
the burden of causation. 51 One concern is that a lessened standard of
causation will lead to overcompensation of plaintiffs who face an
increased risk of future injury.52 For example, if courts lessen the
requirements of causation, more defendants will be held responsible for
an injury that they did not cause, and damages will be awarded for
injuries that likely might not occur. 53 This award of damages, some
argue, is a violation of traditional notions of corrective justice. 54
Fundamental to our system of justice is the notion that a defendant
51. In a traditional suit for negligence, there are four main elements that a plaintiff must
prove: (1) that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff; (2) that the defendant breached that
duty; (3) that the defendant's breached caused the plaintiffs injury; and (4) that the plaintiff was
in fact injured. Galligan, supra note 46, at 1510-14 (describing in detail the elements necessary
for a negligence action). In the increased risk situation, supporters of the all-or-nothing rule are
primarily concerned that the element of causation is being compromised. See supra Part ll.A. l.a
(discussing why supporters of the all-or-nothing rule point to traditional theories of causation as
the basis for the rule). Traditionally, in order to prove that a defendant's actions caused a
plaintiff's injuries, the plaintiff must show that the injury would not have occurred "but for" the
defendant's actions (known as legal causation) and that the injury was closely enough related to
the defendant's actions that it would be justified to hold that defendant responsible (called
proximate causation). See Galligan, supra note 46, at 1512-14 (discussing and giving examples
of legal and proximate causations); see also infra Part II.B (discussing alternatives to the all-or-
nothing rule of recovery).
52. Lapeze, supra note 38, at 253-54; see, e.g., Hahn v. McDowell, 349 S.W.2d 479, 482
(Mo. Ct. App. 1961) ("[I]t would be plainly unjust to compel one to pay damages for results that
may or may not ensue and which are merely problematical."); Kramer v. Lewisville Mem'l
Hosp., 858 S.W.2d 397, 405 (Tex. 1993) ("[L]egal responsibility [under the loss of chance
doctrine] is in reality assigned based on the mere possibility that a tortfeasor's negligence was a
cause of the ultimate harm.").
53. Lapeze, supra note 38, at 254 (providing reasons that courts require a higher standard of
causation).
54. Andrew R. Klein, A Model for Enhanced Risk Recovery in Tort, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1173, 1187-94 (1999) (discussing the theory of proportional liability and why corrective justice
theorists disagree with the notion of meting out damages in proportion to a plaintiff's risk).
Such a result troubles corrective justice theorists because it imposes tort liability
without proof of a nexus between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's harm.
Indeed, corrective justice scholars have been outright hostile to the notion of violating
this principle in the pursuit of the efficiency that proportional liability advocates hope
to achieve.
Id. at 1190; see also Richard W. Wright, The Efficiency Theory of Causation and Responsibility:
Unscientific Formalism and False Semantics, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 553, 578 (1987) (arguing
that new methods of proportional liability (namely, the "efficiency theory") are inferior to the
traditional negligence theory because these new methods lack adequate causation principles).
"The disappearance of the causation requirement from the efficiency theory and its replacement
with mathematical functions ... is neither scientific progress nor a cause for celebration."
Wright, supra, at 578.
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should right the wrongs that he causes a plaintiff to suffer.55 However,
a lower standard of causation will penalize a defendant unfairly by
making him pay for a harm that the plaintiff cannot prove the defendant
caused.56
Another policy concern is that if the causation standard is lessened, it
could potentially "open the floodgates" to significantly more
litigation. 57  The concern is that any plaintiff who proved even a
miniscule risk of future injury could obtain a judgment.58  This
increased litigation, some argue, threatens a massive administrative
strain on the judicial system. 59
Some scholars are also concerned that, because many increased risk
claims arise in the arena of medical malpractice, lessening the burden of
causation would unfairly penalize those in the medical profession.
60
Indeed, increased malpractice litigation could lead to increased cost of
medical care.61  As some scholars point out, the cost of medical
treatment has already increased over the past twenty years because of
55. Kenneth W. Simons, Corrective Justice and Liability for Risk-Creation: A Comment, 38
UCLA L. REV. 113, 125-26, 126 n.47 (1990). Kenneth Simons defines corrective justice as the
"defendant's obligation to compensate for harm that she has caused wrongfully or in violation of
the plaintiff's rights." Id. at 125-26.
56. But see infra Part II.A.2.b (discussing how, under the all-or-nothing rule, the defendant
may still be made to compensate for an injury that never occurs).
57. See Lapeze, supra note 38, at 254; Beverly P. Spearman. Note, Tort Law - The Supreme
Court Provides a Remedy for Injured Plaintiffs Under the Theory of Loss of Chance - Alberts v.
Schultz, 30 N.M. L. REV. 387, 399 (2000) (arguing that more patients might seek recovery
merely because they received ineffective treatment or undesirable results).
58. See Lapeze, supra note 38, at 254. This concern is especially prevalent in discussions of
toxic tort cases. Id.; Klein, supra note 54, at 1193 ("[I]t would be nearly impossible in many
instances to monitor each instance of risk creation in society and to extract ex ante payments
accordingly.").
59. Klein, supra note 54, at 1192; Spearman, supra note 57, at 399-400 ("The potential
increase in the number of claims could contribute to an explosion of medical malpractice
litigation and result in an excess burden on court dockets.").
60. Jason Perkins, Note, McMullen v. Ohio State University Hospitals: Legal Recovery for
Terminally Ill and Injured Patients Without the Lost Chance Doctrine, 32 U. TOL. L. REV. 451,
455 (2001); Hodson, supra note 35, at § 2 ("[Lessening the burden of causation would be]
invit[ing] the jury to indulge in speculation and conjecture .... [A] less strict view.., would be
unfair to the medical profession .... ").
Health care providers could find themselves defending cases simply because a patient
fails to improve or where serious disease processes are not arrested because another
course of action could possibly bring a better result. No other professional malpractice
defendant carries the burden of liability without the requirement that plaintiffs prove
the alleged negligence probably rather than possibly caused the injury.
Gooding v. Univ. Hosp. Bldgs., 445 So. 2d 1015, 1019-21 (Fla. 1984), quoted in Perkins, supra,
at 455.
61. Lawrence W. Kessler, Alternative Liability in Litigation Malpractice Actions: Eradicating
the Lost Resort of Scoundrels, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 401, 412-13 (2000).
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fears of malpractice litigation; doctors are already practicing "defensive
medicine." 62
2. Critiques
In the past twenty-five years, the all-or-nothing rule has received
much criticism.63 This Part explores some of these critiques. 64
62. Lisa Perrochet et al., Lost Chance Recovery and the Folly of Expanding Medical
Malpractice Liability, 27 TORT & INS. L.J. 615, 625 (1992). Lisa Perrochet defines "defensive
medicine" in the following way: "[Defensive medicine is w]hen a physician prescribes
unnecessary tests, procedures, hospitalization, or prolonged hospitalization to avoid liability ....
Defensive medicine includes keeping more detailed patient records, more patient referrals,
prescribing additional diagnostic tests, spending more time with patients, and providing
additional treatment procedures." Id.; see also Kessler, supra note 61, at 412-13 (discussing the
link between medical personnel's fear of litigation and increased medical costs). Lawrence
Kessler states:
It is generally accepted that anxiety about potential tort liability has changed the way
medicine is practiced. Doctors now order more tests and recommend more invasive
treatments than in previous years .... [T]here is little doubt that the heightened
concern over lawsuits has ... played a substantial role in restructuring patient
treatment.
Kessler, supra note 61, at 412. Kessler, however, suggests that perhaps a little defensive
medicine is not all bad. Id. at 412 n.41. He states that perhaps it is the "dependency" relationship
between patient and doctor that has made courts lessen the traditional burden and apply doctrines
such as "burden switching" or loss of chance. Id. at 408-09. But see Stanley Joel Reiser,
Malpractice, Patient Safety, and the Ethical and Scientific Foundations of Medicine, in THE
LIABILITY MAZE, THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION 227, 247 (Peter
W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991). Stanley Joel Reiser, after reviewing several studies
dealing with the "question whether the tort system has prevented injury to patients by inducing
better medical practices," concludes:
[T]he liability ethos does not secure the safety of patients because it damages
foundational aspects of medical practice .... This prerogative is undermined by the
current way in which this country determines malpractice and compensates its victims.
Harm caused to patients by malpracticing doctors must be redressed. But our society
should find an alternative way of doing this, one that does not compromise the
knowledge and values of health care and deprive patients of the best possible exercise
of technique, humaneness, and judgment when they enter into a medical relationship.
Id. at 247.
63. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (citing Dillon v. Evanston Hospital, 771 N.E.2d
357, 361 (111. 2002), to explain the most common critiques of the all-or-nothing rule).
64. See infra Part II.A.2.a-e (analyzing several critiques of the all-or-nothing rule including
the following: (a) the contention that causation can still be proven without the all-or-nothing rule;
(b) the all-or-nothing rule works against the purposes of tort law; (c) the all-or-nothing rule
unfairly under- and over-compensates plaintiffs; (d) the all-or-nothing rule, in conjunction with
judicially imposed time limits, such as statutes of limitations, might prevent recovery for
plaintiffs in an increased risk situation; and (e) the rule of res judicata, in conjunction with the all-
or-nothing rule, might prevent a plaintiff from recovering for an increased risk, even if that risk
does eventually occur).
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 34
a. Critics Argue Causation Still Can Be Proven
The primary objection to the all-or-nothing rule is that the risk itself
should be considered an injury, and the possibility of its occurrence
should be considered separately from causation.65 As one court noted,
it seems "a matter of common sense" that the risk of a future injury
should be worth something. 66 Under this analysis, a court should focus
upon whether a defendant caused an increased risk itself.6 7  Instead of
being used to determine causation, the probability of the injury
occurring would only be considered in determining damages. 68 In the
previously discussed car accident hypothetical, the court would
65. See King, "Reduction of Likelihood," supra note 40, at 498-99. Professor Joseph King
concludes that there are five elements to a traditional negligence suit: (1) duty; (2) failure to
exercise reasonable care (breach); (3) but for causation; (4) proximate cause; and (5) the "victim
must have suffered compensable harm." Id. at 497-99. This fifth element is where the analysis
of risk should occur. Id. at 499. But see G. Edward White, The Unexpected Persistence of
Negligence, 1980-2000, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1337, 1351 (2001) (arguing that this type of analysis
is merely disguising the lessening of the "but for" requirement of causation). "Although these
developments all result in the extension of liability where it would previously not have existed,
their principle thrust is to tie accountability in the tort system more directly to negligence, since
without a modification of the 'but for' requirement in those cases negligent defendants would
remain unaccountable." Id.; see also Nichols, supra note 48, at 638 ("For all of its supporters and
detractors, the fact remains that [this type of separate analysis] does, on its face, alter traditional
causation standards.").
66. Feist v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 517 P.2d 675, 680 (Or. 1973) (allowing the jury to
consider medical testimony showing only a possibility of developing meningitis after a skull
fracture). The court held:
[A]s a matter of common sense,... a jury can properly make a larger award of
damages in a case involving a skull fracture of such a nature as to result in a
susceptibility to meningitis than in a case involving a skull fracture of such a nature as
not to result in any such danger, risk, or susceptibility.
Id.
67. JACOB A. STEIN, STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES § 9.16 (3d ed. 1997). Jacob
Stein argues that "[h]ow much [a plaintiff] should be compensated, of course, depends upon what
is fair compensation for what has actually been lost: in short, considering all the odds, what was
the value of the lost chance to avoid the future injury." Id. This type of analysis is often
attributed to Professor Joseph King, who advocated this approach in his original article on loss of
chance. See Klein, supra note 54, at 1186; King, Causation, Valuation, and Chance, supra note
40, at 1353. King continues to argue that this approach provides the correct analysis in a
subsequent article, "Reduction of Likelihood," supra note 40, at 509. See Legum, supra note 50,
at 589 ("This quantum of increased risk is a calculation of damages, not a prerequisite in the
determination of whether the plaintiff has been injured in the first-instance.").
68. Legum, supra note 50, at 589. In fact, once causation is proven to a "reasonable
certainty," damages do not need to be proved with the same level of scrutiny:
[C]ourts have stated that only reasonable certainty is required in proving the fact and
cause of the injury, and that the amount of damages-once their cause and fact have
been shown-need not be proved with the same degree of certainty. This would
indicate that courts are more lenient in allowing the jury to speculate as to the amount
of damages after their cause has been proved.
17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 196 (2002).
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determine whether the defendant more likely than not caused the
plaintiff's increased risk of developing heart disease, and if so, would
calculate damages by evaluating the chance that the heart disease would
develop.69
b. Critics Argue that the All-or-Nothing Rule Works Against
the Purposes of Tort Law
Scholars define the major purposes of tort law as: (1) providing a
peaceful means for compensating parties who might otherwise "take the
law into their own hands"; (2) deterring wrongful conduct; (3)
encouraging socially responsible behavior; and (4) restoring injured
parties to their original condition. 70 Opponents of the all-or-nothing
rule argue that allowing recovery for increased risk itself satisfies more
of these basic purposes than only allowing recovery if the increased risk
is reasonably certain to occur.
7 1
i. The All-or-Nothing Rule: Deterring Wrongful Conduct and
Encouraging Socially Responsible Behavior
Much criticism of the all-or-nothing rule centers around the inability
of a plaintiff to bring a claim for a future injury until that injury actually
occurs. 72 This flaw, opponents urge, works against the notion that
defendants should be held responsible for their tortious conduct. 73 First,
under the all-or-nothing rule, a tortfeasor who merely exposes a person
to risk of injury-so long as that risk is no greater than 50%-will not
be held accountable and has little or no incentive to cease the tortious
conduct. 74 Second, even if the plaintiff who has been exposed to that
69. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text (providing a hypothetical increased risk
situation).
70. WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS I (10th ed. 2000); see
also Ashton, supra note 38, at 1086 (describing the four major purposes of tort law).
71. Lapeze, supra note 38, at 251 (arguing that allowing recovery for increased risk satisfies
basic tort purposes such as preventing future harm, deterring wrongful behavior, and
compensating the injured party); see also infra Part I.A.2.b.i (analyzing the effect of the all-or-
nothing rule on the tort goals of deterring wrongful conduct and encouraging responsible
behavior); infra Part ll.A.2.b.ii (discussing the possible effects of the all-or-nothing rule on the
tort goal of returning a plaintiff to his or her original condition).
72. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text (explaining the argument that causation can
still be proven when the risk itself is considered a separate injury).
73. Tamsen Douglass Love, Deterring Irresponsible Use and Disposal of Toxic Substances:
The Case for Legislative Recognition of Increased Risk, 49 VAND. L. REV. 789, 802-04 (1996);
Lapeze, supra note 38, at 251.
74. See Love, supra note 73, at 802; Lapeze, supra note 38, at 251. Tamsen Douglass Love
further points out that in the case of toxic exposure by a corporation, the people operating the
company at the time of the contamination may not be motivated to change their behavior merely
for the sake of their successors. Love, supra note 73, at 803.
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risk eventually develops an injury, during the lapse in time between the
initial tortious conduct and the injury, the tortfeasor might die, become
bankrupt, or disappear.75  These problems are of special concern in
toxic tort claims when latency periods for disease can be very long.76
Tortfeasors in these situations can continue to expose people to toxic
elements, well after they become aware of the possible negative effects,
because they face no immediate consequences for their actions. 77
ii. The All-or-Nothing Rule Does Not Restore the Plaintiff to His
Original Condition
Although it is often impossible to truly restore an injured plaintiff to
his or her original condition, tort law attempts to compensate victims as
closely as possible for their injuries.78  Proof of causation can bei
especially difficult when a plaintiff is trying to recover for an increased
risk of a future injury. 79 Opponents of the all-or-nothing rule argue that
the risk of a future injury, if in fact caused by the defendant, should be
compensated, regardless of the probability of an injury actually
occurring. 80 Moreover, if, because of difficulties in proving causation,
a plaintiff is made to wait until that future injury actually occurs, he or
75. Love, supra note 73, at 802-03 (discussing the problems with recovering for toxic
exposure, especially when there is a long latency period before the illness manifests itself);
Gregory L. Ash, Comment, Toxic Torts and Latent Diseases: The Case for an Increased Risk
Cause of Action, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 1087 (1990) ("Even if delayed manifestation disease
claimants are never barred from suit, they still will suffer from the problems associated with
being forced to sue years after the exposure occurs."); Lapeze, supra note 38, at 251 (noting that
"because of the great lapse in time [in toxic exposure cases], defendants may become bankrupt,
die, or disappear").
76. Love, supra note 73, at 803; Ash, supra note 75, at 1092-93 (discussing an example of
when latency periods can pose a problem for tort victims). See generally William V. Dunlap &
Michael E. Thomas, Note, Tort Actions for Cancer: Deterrence, Compensation, and
Environmental Carcinogenesis, 90 YALE L.J. 840 (1981) (discussing the problems of long
latency periods in toxic tort claims).
77. See, e.g., Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1230 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1986)
(holding that parents of minors who died of leukemia allegedly caused by exposure to
contaminated water could not recover for their increased susceptibility to future illness, in part
because they could not prove that those injuries were reasonably certain to occur).
78. PROSSER ET AL., supra note 70, at 1.
79. See Hodson, supra note 35, at § 2. Especially in a loss of chance situation, discussed infra
Part II.C.2.b, the plaintiff often does not originally have a greater than 50% chance of surviving
the original harm. Id. Thus, it is often impossible to prove that the plaintiffs negligence
"caused" the future injury. See id.
80. STEIN, supra note 67, at § 9.16. Jacob Stein reasons:
Compensation should be given for the fact of increased susceptibility to the illness ...
even though a particular injury may increase the chances of the plaintiffs developing
epilepsy or cancer by only three percent, the fact is that the chances are increased, and
the plaintiff should be compensated for that injury.
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she may be unable to recover because of statutory limitations, 81
practical difficulties resulting from a delay in litigation, 82 judgment-
proof defendants,83 or possibly his own death.84
c. Critics Argue that the All-or-Nothing Rule Results in Either
Under-Compensation or Over-Compensation
Another possible limitation of the all-or-nothing rule is that it unfairly
over- or under-compensates plaintiffs. 85 Inappropriate compensation
occurs because the rule awards full damages, meaning that the plaintiff
is compensated as if the injury has actually occurred, if the plaintiff can
show a probability of occurrence exceeding 50%.86 Conversely, under-
compensation occurs because the plaintiff receives no damages if the
injury is less than 50% likely to occur. 87 Thus, many plaintiffs who are
able to recover in full never experience the compensated injury; in
contrast, many plaintiffs who are denied any recovery develop the
uncompensated injury. 88 In these cases, a plaintiff's recovery rests fully
in the hands of expert witnesses who testify at trial as to the probability
81. See infra Part lI.A.2.d (discussing the impact of jurisdictional statutes of limitations on
claims for increased risk when the jurisdiction adheres to the all-or-nothing rule).
82. See infra note 108 (noting how these practical limitations include locating witnesses and
recovering from an insolvent or missing defendant).
83. See infra note 108 (describing how a defendant might have become bankrupt or have gone
missing).
84. KEETON ET AL., supra note 45, § 4, at 25; Lapeze, supra note 38, at 251. In loss of chance
situations, discussed infra Part lI.C.2.b, the death of the plaintiff is a real possibility if he or she is
not able to recover before the future injury actually occurs.
85. See Ashton, supra note 38, at 1097 (providing an example of when a plaintiff could be
overly compensated); see also Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 524 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) (discussing, in dicta, the "perhaps worse" possibility that a plaintiff could be under-
compensated for injuries sustained through exposure to toxins).
86. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (explaining the all-or-nothing rule).
87. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (explaining the all-or-nothing rule).
88. See Ashton, supra note 38, at 1097. Ashton gives a poignant example of how the all-or-
nothing rule could overcompensate victims of toxic exposure. In his example, 100 shipyard
workers are exposed to asbestos on the job. Id. One of these workers sues the defendant
employer and presents at trial epidemiological studies that establish that he has a 51% chance of
developing cancer due to his exposure to asbestos. Id. Under the all-or-nothing rule, he recovers
in full. Id. When the other ninety-nine workers hear of his success, they in turn bring the
defendant to court, relying upon the same epidemiological study. Id. Although statistically, only
half will become sick, the first plaintiffs to successfully sue the defendant will recover in full;
those that wait may discover that the defendant is no longer in a position to compensate them,
even if they are part of the 50% who do get sick. Id.; see also Legum, supra note 50, at 568-69
(discussing how plaintiffs who can prove a greater than 50% chance that a future injury will occur
can recover fully under the all-or-nothing rule, whereas plaintiffs with a risk of future injury that
is less than 50% are denied any compensation).
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of occurrence. 89 Under the all-or-nothing rule, recovery often depends
solely on the statistical number that these witnesses give; is it a 51%
chance or a 49% chance? 90 As a result, some commentators suggest
that this demand for statistics will increase pressure on medical
witnesses to produce precise figures as to a probability, even if they
cannot do so with scientific certainty. 9'
d. The All-or-Nothing Rule and Jurisdictional Time Periods
If a plaintiff is unable to meet the probability standard under the all-
or-nothing rule, he may be forced to delay litigation until the risk of
future injury develops into an actual, tangible injury. 92 Unfortunately
for many plaintiffs, delay is impossible because of restrictions such as
jurisdictional statutes of limitation.93 Delays are especially problematic
in increased risk claims involving long latency time periods, where
exposure or disease may lay dormant in the human body well past the
jurisdictional statute of limitations.94
89. See DePass v. United States, 721 F.2d 203, 207 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., dissenting)
(arguing that all legal evidence is probabilistic, and the fact that something seems less likely to
occur than any other doesn't mean that it shouldn't be recoverable).
90. Legum, supra note 50, at 568-69 (discussing how, under the all-or-nothing rule, a plaintiff
who proves that there is a 60% chance of future injury recovers in full while a plaintiff who
proves a 40% chance of future injury recovers nothing).
91. Spearman, supra note 57, at 401. This problem also arises in toxic tort litigation when
plaintiffs are relying on epidemiological studies. See Legum, supra note 50, at n. 37. "Another
limitation of epidemiological studies is that they can seldom follow the strict requirements of
experimental science, such as the requirement that only one or two variables be different between
the exposed and the unexposed group. Consequently, the available observations may be subject
to more than one interpretation." Id. (citing Richard Doll & Sir Richard Peto, The Causes of
Cancer: Quantitative Estimates of Avoidable Risks of Cancer in the United States Today, 66 J.
NAT'L CANCER INST. 1191, 1218 (1981)).
92. Lisa Heinzerling & Cameron Powers Hoffman, Tortious Toxics, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL.
L. & POL'Y REV. 67, 74 (2001); Spearman, supra note 57, at 399.
93. Heinzerling & Hoffman, supra note 92, at 74; Spearman, supra note 57, at 399. Some
states, however, have extended the statutes of limitations, especially for toxic tort claims. See
infra Part II.A.2.d (discussing the restrictions jurisdictional time limits place on recovering for an
increased risk, especially in all-or-nothing rule jurisdictions).
94. See, e.g., Albertson v. T.J. Stevenson & Co., 749 F.2d 223, 233 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding
that a statute of limitations barred plaintiff's claim for physical and psychological illness, due to
exposure to a toxic chemical, when the plaintiff was not diagnosed until twelve years after initial
exposure); Spearman, supra note 57, at 399 (noting that HIV, the virus that causes AIDS, can lie
dormant in the human body for up to five years; thus, a plaintiff negligently exposed to the virus
may be barred by a state's statute of limitations if he or she subsequently develops the disease).
Statute of limitations is defined as:
Statutes of the federal government and various states setting maximum time periods
during which certain actions can be brought or rights enforced. After the time period
set out in the applicable statute of limitations has run, no legal action can be brought
regardless of whether any cause of action ever existed.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 927 (6th ed. 1990).
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e. Res Judicata in Combination with the All-or-Nothing Rule Unfairly
Restricts Legitimate Claims
In a traditional suit for negligence, a plaintiff is barred from
recovering more than once for injuries stemming from a single incident
by the rule of res judicata. 95  Thus, a plaintiff must try to recover all
past, present, and prospective damages in one suit.96 Although this rule
is meant to protect defendants from civil double jeopardy, it can cause
problems for plaintiffs who have present, recoverable injuries, as well
as future, unrecoverable injuries. 97  For example, in the car accident
hypothetical, the plaintiff probably would want to sue immediately in
order to recover for the cost of his present injury, the leg amputation. 98
Under the all-or-nothing rule, however, he is presently unable to recover
for the increased risk of developing heart disease because the risk is less
than 50%. Therefore, if he sues right away, he will be barred from
recovering for the heart disease, even if it later develops.
Illinois courts have held fast to the rule of res judicata, even as they
acknowledge the problems created for plaintiffs who are attempting to
recover prospective damages. 99 The risk that a plaintiff might lose the
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982). The Restatement explains:
(I) When a valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes the plaintiff's
claim pursuant to the rules of merger or bar ... the claim extinguished includes all
rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of
the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose.
Id. Res judicata is defined as the "[r]ule that a final judgment rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and, as to
them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand or
cause of action." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1305 (6th ed. 1990).
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 910 cmt. d (1965) (recommending that plaintiffs
"must bring their actions no more than three years from the date of the act or omission
complained of"); see also Howell v. Goodrich, 69 111. 556, 559-60 (1873) (holding that a plaintiff
may not bring successive suits for injuries arising out of one transaction): Mason v. Parker. 695
N.E.2d 70, 72 (111. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1998) (holding that a plaintiff may not separate claims for
personal injury and property damage all arising from one suit; both claims must be brought
together or they will be precluded); Radosta v. Chrysler Corp., 443 N.E.2d 670, 672 (II1. App. Ct.
1st Dist. 1982) (holding that a plaintiff may not sue for indemnity for injury after already
recovering personal injury damages).
97. Heinzerling & Hoffman, supra note 92, at 73 (discussing the negative impact of res
judicata on victims of toxic torts); Klein, supra note 54, at 1182; see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 910 (1965) ("One injured by the tort of another is entitled to recover
damages from the other for all harm, past, present and prospective, legally caused by the tort.").
98. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text (describing a hypothetical increased risk
scenario).
99. See Howell, 69 111. at 559-60 (reiterating the rule that a plaintiff may only sue once for
injuries, future and present, sustained from the same transaction or occurrence); Mason. 695
N.E.2d at 71 (discussing what is necessary to bar a claim under the doctrine of res judicata);
Radosta, 443 N.E.2d at 672 (discussing Illinois law regarding the doctrine of res judicata).
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ability to recover for future damages, courts reason, is far outweighed
by the need to protect defendants from multiple attempts at litigation. 1
00
B. Rejection of the All-or-Nothing Rule: Different Remedies
Most states have recognized at least some of the limitations to the all-
or-nothing rule. 10 1 Two types of solutions were created in order to
remedy the problems created by the rule. Some states made slight
modifications to existing traditional tort rules, while others created new
causes of action. 102
1. "Tinkering" with the Traditional Tort Rules
Courts and legislative bodies developed three new methods in an
attempt to remedy some of the problems created by the all-or-nothing
rule, while at the same time maintaining traditional tort principles.
10 3
This Part briefly explains these three methods, exploring their strengths
and their limitations.104
a. The Discovery Rule
The discovery rule delays the statute of limitations for recovery for a
future injury until the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the
injury. 10 5 The discovery rule has the greatest impact on injuries with a
long latency period, such as exposure to toxic chemicals. 10 6 In fact,
100. Radosta, 443 N.E.2d at 72 ("This rule is founded upon the plainest and most substantial
justice, that litigation should have an end and that no person should be unnecessarily harassed
with a multiplicity of lawsuits."); see also Mason, 695 N.E.2d at 672 (discussing the rationale
behind the rule of res judicata).
101. See Ashton, supra note 38, at 1085; see also infra Part II.B (listing several remedies
certain jurisdictions have used in order to get around the perceived inequity of the all-or-nothing
rule).
102. Lapeze, supra note 38, at 257. Lapeze calls this first approach, making modifications to
traditional tort rules, "tinkering," and the second approach, creating new causes of action,
"redefining the injuries." Id. In some jurisdictions, these two approaches are combined. Id.; see
also infra notes 105-20 and accompanying text (describing the "tinkering" methods of the
discovery rule, splitting causes of action, and lowering the standard of causation); infra notes
121-91 and accompanying text (describing new causes of action called fear of future disease,
medical monitoring, loss of chance, and increased risk).
103. See infra Part lI.B. la-c (analyzing these three methods of tinkering: the discovery rule,
allowing the plaintiff to "split" her causes of action, and lessening the burden of causation).
104. See infra Part II.B.l.a (discussing the discovery rule); infra Part II.B.l.b (describing the
method that allows a plaintiff to split his or her cause of action); infra Part II.B. .c (describing the
rare instance in which courts will lessen the burden of causation in order to allow a plaintiff to
recover).
105. Ashton, supra note 38, at 1088; Lapeze, supra note 38, at 257.
106. See, e.g., Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 169-70 (1949) (holding that it would be
unjust to allow the statute of limitations to run on a toxic tort claim before the plaintiff realized
that he was sick). The court in Urie v. Thompson stated:
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Congress recently extended all state statutes of limitations for plaintiffs
who have been exposed to toxic substances.1
0 7
The discovery rule, however, has limited applications in many
increased risk situations. 10 8  If the plaintiff has already suffered a
recoverable injury, as in the car accident hypothetical above, 10 9 the
extension of time will be inconsequential because first, the plaintiff is
most likely aware at the time of the original injury of other possible
future consequences, and second, if the plaintiff attempts to recover for
the original injury, the claim for future injuries will be barred under the
theory of res j udicata. 110
b. Splitting the Cause of Action
Several jurisdictions allow plaintiffs to "split" a cause of action into
two separate claims, even though both arise out of the same transaction
or occurrence. I l l Thus, a plaintiff who has suffered both a present
We do not think the humane legislative plan intended such consequences to attach to
blameless ignorance. Nor do we think those consequences can be reconciled with the
traditional purposes of statutes of limitations, which conventionally require the
assertion of claims within a specified period of time after notice of the invasion of legal
rights.
Id. at 170; see Lapeze, supra note 38, at 257-58 (discussing the impact of the discovery rule upon
claims for injuries resulting from toxic exposure); see also Ashton, supra note 38, at 1088
(discussing how the discovery rule creates difficulties in establishing causation between a present
injury and a tortious act occurring many years ago); Note, The Fairness and Constitutionality of
Statutes of Limitations for Toxic Tort Suits, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1683, 1685 (1983) ("Toxic tort
victims do not become aware of their injuries until decades after the tortious act.").
107. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §
9658 (2000). According to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act, "[iun the case of any action brought under State law for personal injury, or property
damages, which are caused or contributed to by exposure to any hazardous substance, or pollutant
or contaminant, released into the environment from a facility," the state statute of limitations will
not start to run until the plaintiff "knew (or reasonably should have known)" that the injury was
caused by the toxic substance. Id.
108. Lapeze, supra note 38, at 258. Even in the case of toxic exposure, the discovery rule has
several limitations. Id. First, it is often hard to determine at what point the plaintiff knew or
should have known about the injury. Id. Second, the lapse in time will create problems for
recovery such as locating witnesses and recovering from a possibly insolvent or missing
defendant. Id.; see also Love, supra note 73, at 802-03 (discussing the barriers of traditional tort
law); Legum, supra note 50, at 576-77 (discussing possible consequences of actions brought for
increased risk of cancer).
109. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text (providing an increased risk hypothetical).
110. See supra Part II.A.2.e (discussing the theory of res judicata and how it could unfairly
prevent legitimate claims).
I 11. Ashton, supra note 38, at 1092; Lapeze, supra note 38, at 259-60. These jurisdictions
include the District of Columbia, California, Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania. See, e.g., Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 120 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (holding that the statue of limitations on asbestos claims does not run until the disease
manifests itself); Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1231-32 (Mass. Dist. Ct.
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injury and an increased risk of future injury has two separate tort
actions, one for the present injury and one for any future injury, once it
occurs.
1 12 Using the car accident scenario above, the plaintiff would be
able to immediately bring suit for the present injury of losing his leg,
but he would not be able to recover for his heightened chance of early
death resulting from heart disease, until that death actually occurred.1 13
Although this rule eliminates the concern about speculative damages, 114
some scholars express concern that splitting the cause of action subjects
defendants to multiple litigation and does not remedy problems
1986) (interpreting Massachusetts law and holding that the increased risk of cancer is a different
claim than a claim regarding illnesses the plaintiff has actually suffered); Martinez-Ferrer v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 164 Cal. Rptr. 591 (Ct. App. 1980) (holding that earlier symptoms of a
disease do not bar a later claim on the full disease); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d
517, 521-26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that a plaintiff could not recover for an increased
risk of cancer on top of a claim for injury by asbestos), appeal denied, 492 So. 2d 1331 (Fla.
1986); Larson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 399 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Mich. 1986) (holding that it was
unreasonable to bar a claim for asbestos-related illness based on the statute of limitations since
the disease could not have developed before the statute ran); Mauro v. Raymark Indus., 561 A.2d
257, 264 (N.J. 1989) (holding that neither statute of limitations nor single controversy doctrine
will bar a toxic tort plaintiffs timely damage claim after the discovery of a casually related
disease); Simmons v. Pacor, Inc., 674 A.2d 232, 239 (Pa. 1996) (holding that medical monitoring
should be allowed for plaintiffs who may later develop asbestos related diseases). Illinois has not
allowed this type of claim splitting. See supra notes 99-100 (discussing res judicata in Illinois).
But see section 26 of the Second Restatement of Judgments, advocating that in the following
increased risk situations, splitting of claims should be allowed:
(b) The court in the first action has expressly reserved the plaintiff's right to
maintain the second action; or ....
(f) It is clearly and convincingly shown that the policies favoring preclusion of a
second action are overcome for an extraordinary reason, such as the apparent invalidity
of a continuing restraint or condition having a vital relation to personal liberty or the
failure of the prior litigation to yield a coherent disposition of the controversy.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26 (1982).
112. Ashton, supra note 38, at 1092 (describing the two causes of action possible under claim
splitting as "one for the present injury and one that does not accrue until the latent disease [or
injury] occurs"); cf Carroll v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 37 S.W.3d 699 (Ky. 2000). In
Carroll v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., the court allowed the plaintiff to bring a negligence
action when he developed lung cancer due to asbestos exposure, even though the state statute of
limitations had run on the original asbestos claim. Id. at 700. The court, however, allowed the
plaintiff to bring the second action not on the theory of splitting a cause of action but rather on the
theory that there were two distinct injuries, brought about by the same substance. Id.
113. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text (providing the car accident increased risk
hypothetical). Obviously, in the hypothetical car accident situation, the plaintiff himself would
never be able to recover for the risk of death due to heart disease because the death, as the
increased risk, has to occur before he can recover.
114. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the rationale behind the all-or-nothing rule).
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regarding important tort goals, such as deterrence and fair
compensation. 115
c. Lessening the Burden of Causation
Although rare, some jurisdictions have occasionally lessened
traditional causation standards of proof in order to compensate a
plaintiff who could not otherwise recover damages for a future
injury.1 16  One example of this modification of causation standards is
the case of Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories.117 In Sindell, a plaintiff was
attempting to recover for future damages resulting from
diethylstilbestrol ("DES")" 8 exposure but was unable to determine
which of the drug manufacturers actually distributed the drug that
caused her injuries. 119 Rather than deny the plaintiff damages because
she failed to prove causation, the court lowered the reasonable certainty
standard and held the defendants liable, but only in proportion to the
economic benefit the manufacturers had received from the industry as a
whole. 12
0
2. Creation of New Causes of Action
Other courts have gone beyond "tinkering" with traditional tort
principles in an effort to remedy problems with the all-or-nothing rule,
115. Ashton, supra note 38, at 1092, 1116 (discussing why tort goals are not served by
splitting causes of action).
116. Love, supra note 73, at 817-18 (discussing instances where courts have modified
causation principles, especially in the case of toxic tort litigation). But see King, Causation,
Valuation, and Chance, supra note 40, at 1370.
Attempts to deal with the problem posed by the destruction of a chance by tinkering
with the standard of proof can only further confuse matters of loss assignment. If the
law on this question is to be rationalized, a vehicle other than the standard of proof will
have to be used. The appropriate vehicle is a reevaluation of the traditional ways of
thinking about the interest for which relief is sought and the role of chance in valuing
that interest.
Id.
117. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
118. According to the American Heritage College Dictionary, DES is "[a] synthetic
compound.. . having estrogenic properties and no longer prescribed during pregnancy because of
the incidence of certain vaginal cancers in the daughters of women so treated." AM. HERITAGE
C. DICTIONARY 375 (3d ed. 1997).
119. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 928-29.
120. Id. at 937; see also Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755 (N.J. 1984) (holding a doctor liable
for an injury resulting to a baby even though the plaintiff had not met the requisite standard of
causation).
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and have created entirely new causes of action. 121  This Part discusses
four of these new emerging causes of action. 122
a. Toxic Tort Claims: Fear of Future Disease and Medical Monitoring
Several new causes of action were created primarily to allow
recovery for instances of latent illness, such as exposure to a toxic
substance. 123 Although these new causes of action arise primarily in
toxic tort cases, a brief description is warranted because they are
relevant to any discussion of future illness. 124  Two of the most
prominent claims are the fear of future disease and medical
monitoring. 12 5
i. Fear of Future Disease
The claim for "fear of future disease" is fundamentally a claim for
emotional distress that arises out of a plaintiff's fear of developing a
future illness as a result of a defendant's negligence. 126 In the most
common scenario, this cause of action is brought based upon a
plaintiffs fear of developing cancer or AIDS. 127  In a cause of action
for fear of disease, a plaintiff must prove first that the defendant's
121. See infra Part II.B.2.a-c (discussing four new causes of action, including fear of future
disease, medical monitoring, loss of chance, and increased risk, which were created to solve some
of the inherent problems of the all-or-nothing rule).
122. See infra Part II.B.2.a (explaining the fear of future disease claim and the medical
monitoring claim, both of which are used almost exclusively in toxic tort cases); infra Part
II.B.2.b (describing the loss of chance doctrine); infra Part II.B.2.c (exploring the development of
an increased risk doctrine).
123. See Lapeze, supra note 38, at 260-65. "Latent illness" refers to cases (often toxic tort
cases) where the plaintiffs damages "do not manifest themselves for several years after the
original exposure or injury." Id. at 251.
124. See, e.g., Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993) (allowing
plaintiff exposed to contaminated water caused by defendant's negligence to recover for fear of
cancer and medical monitoring costs). "Where a plaintiff can demonstrate a physical injury
caused by the defendant's negligence, anxiety specifically due to a reasonable fear of a future
harm attributable to the injury may also constitute a proper element of damages." Id. at 805.
125. See Lapeze, supra note 38, at 260-65 (examining causes of action for the fear of future
disease and medical monitoring).
126. Id. at 260-61; see Love, supra note 73, at 804-05; Heinzerling & Hoffman, supra note
92, at 69. See generally Andrew R. Klein, Fear of Disease and the Puzzle of Futures Cases in
Tort, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 965, 968 (2002) (discussing recovery for the fear of future disease);
Janet Smith, Increasing Fear of Future Injury Claims: Where Speculation Carries the Day, 64
DEF. COUNS. J. 547 (1997) (discussing recovery allowed for the fear of future injury and some
policy arguments against the cause of action).
127. Robert Michael Ey, Cause of Action to Recover Damages for Fear of Future Contraction
of Disease, 8 CAUSES OF ACTION 2d § 1, at 157 (1995); see Herbert v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.,
31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 709 (Ct. App. 1994) (allowing the expansion of fear of future disease to extend
to AIDS as well as cancer).
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conduct negligently exposed the plaintiff to the toxic substance, and
then that the plaintiff suffered reasonable emotional distress due to the
fear of that future illness.
128
An example of a claim for fear of future disease is the case of Potter
v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. 129  In Potter, four plaintiffs sued
Firestone for fear of cancer, alleging that Firestone contaminated their
drinking water by illegally dumping carcinogenic waste into a nearby
landfill. 130 The California Supreme Court first addressed the issue of
whether the plaintiffs could sustain a claim for fear of future disease
without showing any present, tangible physical injury. 131 Although the
court acknowledged that under California law, a plaintiff must prove the
existence of a physical injury in order to recover damages for emotional
distress, the court found that the physical injury requirement should not
apply to the claim for fear of future injury. 132 Next, the California court
turned to the issue of whether the plaintiffs' fears were "reasonable."
' 133
Although the court acknowledged that it may not be unreasonable for a
person exposed to any cancerous agents to have a reasonable fear of
cancer, the court determined, based on public policy reasons, that the
plaintiff must show a "probable" likelihood of developing cancer, not
128. Lapeze, supra note 38, at 261-62. Some jurisdictions add an additional element: that the
plaintiff must show some physical manifestation of toxic exposure at the time of recovery. Id. at
262; see also Ey, supra note 127, at § 2 (discussing different jurisdictional standards for bringing
a claim based upon fear of future disease).
129. Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993).
130. Id. at 801-02. Among the chemicals allegedly dumped into the nearby landfill were
benzene and vinyl chloride, both known to be human carcinogens. Id.
131. Id. at 804.
132. Id.at 809-10.
This argument overlooks the reasons for our decision to discard the requirement of
physical injury. As we observed more than a decade ago, "[tihe primary justification
for the requirement of physical injury appears to be that it serves as a screening device
to minimize a presumed risk of feigned injuries and false claims."
Id. at 809 (alteration in original) (quoting Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813, 818
(Cal. 1980)). The California Supreme Court also discussed the requirement that, under a suit for
any kind of negligence, the plaintiff must show that the defendant had a duty to the plaintiff that
the defendant breached. Id. at 807-08. In Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., the court found
that Firestone did in fact owe a duty to the plaintiffs; that duty was imposed by law:
Firestone did violate a duty imposed on it by law and regulation to dispose of toxic
waste only in a class I landfill and to avoid contamination of underground water. The
violation led directly to plaintiffs' ingestion of various known and suspected
carcinogens, and thus to their fear of suffering the very harm which the Legislature
sought by statute to avoid. Their fear of cancer was proximately caused by Firestone's
unlawful conduct which threatened serious physical injury.
Id. at 808.
133. Id.at8lO.
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merely a possibility. 134  The court, however, added that if the plaintiff
showed the defendant acted with oppression, fraud, or malice, the
plaintiff need not meet the "probable" threshold. 135 In the Potter case,
although the plaintiffs' exposure to cancerous agents increased their
chances of developing cancer by only 20-30%, the California Supreme
Court found that the defendants acted with malice and fraud. 136  Thus,
the plaintiffs were allowed to recover for the fear of future disease. 137
ii. Medical Monitoring
"Medical monitoring" is a claim that allows a plaintiff to seek
recovery for the cost of periodic medical examinations meant to detect
the emergence of a latent disease resulting from exposure to a toxic
substance. 138 In order to recover for medical monitoring, the plaintiff
134. Id. at 808.
We cannot say that it would never be reasonable for a person who has ingested toxic
substances to harbor a genuine and serious fear of cancer where reliable medical or
scientific opinion indicates that such ingestion has significantly increased his or her
risk of cancer, but not to a probable likelihood. Indeed, we would be very hard pressed
to find that, as a matter of law, a plaintiff faced with a 20 percent or 30 percent chance
of developing cancer cannot genuinely, seriously and reasonably fear the prospect of
cancer. Nonetheless, we conclude, for the public policy reasons identified below, that
emotional distress caused by the fear of a cancer that is not probable should generally
not be compensable in a negligence action.
Id. The public policy reasons the court laid out were as follows: (1) fear of compromising the
"availability and affordability of liability insurance for toxic liability risks"; (2) the possible
detrimental impact on the health care field; (3) the detrimental affect of allowing fear of cancer
recovery to those plaintiffs who actually develop cancer; and (4) the need to establish a rule that
can be applied from case to case. Id. at 812-14.
"Probable" in this case seems to refer to the "reasonably certain" standard used by many
jurisdictions in determining a plaintiff's ability to recover under the all-or-nothing rule. See
supra note 38 (noting that, although the terminology may differ between jurisdictions, the basic
test is whether the plaintiff has proved that the risk is more than 50% likely to occur).
135. Potter, 863 P.2d at 817 ("[Flear of cancer damages may be recovered without
demonstrating that cancer is probable where it is shown that the defendant is guilty of 'despicable
conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights
or safety of others."').
136. Id. at 818. The California Supreme Court held that Firestone acted with "oppression,
fraud, or malice" because key Firestone officials had knowledge of the dangers of.careless
disposal of toxic chemicals and did not act to stop the disposal. Id.
137. Id.
138. Lapeze, supra note 38, at 263. For a leading case on medical monitoring, see Ayers v.
Jackson Township, 525 A.2d 287, 312-13 (N.J. 1987) (holding that plaintiffs could recover for
future medical surveillance to detect signs of cancer on the theory that the medical expenses
could be construed as presently identifiable injuries); see also Love, supra note 73, at 805-06
(discussing generally a claim of medical monitoring); Kara L. McCall, Comment, Medical
Monitoring Plaintiffs and Subsequent Claims for Disease, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 969, 975-97 (1999)
(exploring in detail the claim for medical monitoring).
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must prove that the exposure to the toxic substance caused a need for
medical monitoring. 139
The California Supreme Court in Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co. also allowed the toxically exposed plaintiffs to recover for medical
monitoring costs, despite the mere possibility that the plaintiffs would
later develop cancer. 140 The court noted that, under California law,
courts do not need to inquire into the probability of future injury in
order to award medical monitoring costs. 14 1 This rule is based on
public policy considerations such as: (1) the public health interest of
early detection; (2) deterring wrongful behavior by pollutants; (3)
reducing medical costs because of early detection; and (4) better serving
societal notions of fairness and justice. 142  In light of these
considerations, the plaintiffs in Potter were allowed to recover for
"reasonable and necessary periodic examination" in order to monitor
their possible development of cancer. 143
b. Loss of Chance
This Part focuses on a popular new cause of action, the "loss of
chance" doctrine, adopted by many jurisdictions over the past twenty
years.
139. Lapeze, supra note 38, at 263-64 (discussing the burden of proof necessary to prove a
medical monitoring claim).
140. Potter, 863 P.2d at 821-25; see also supra notes 129-37 and accompanying text
(discussing the facts of Potter and the California Supreme Court's holding regarding fear of
future disease).
141. Potter, 863 P.2d at 824. "It bears emphasizing that allowing compensation for medical
monitoring costs 'does not require courts to speculate about the probability of future injury. It
merely requires courts to ascertain the probability that the far less costly remedy of medical
supervision is appropriate."' Id. (quoting In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 916 F.2d 829,
852 (3d Cir. 1990)).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 825.
144. See infra note 146 (listing the jurisdictions which have adopted the loss of chance
doctrine). The foundations of the loss of chance doctrine are generally attributed to Hicks v.
United States, 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966) (holding that a physician was liable for negligence
when his failure to act terminated a patient's chances of survival). Jason Perkins, Note,
McMullen v. Ohio State University Hospitals: Legal Recovery for Terminally Ill and Injured
Patients Without the Lost Chance Doctrine, 32 U. TOL. L. REv. 451, 453 (2001). The theoretical
underpinnings of the doctrine of loss of chance, however, may be attributed to Professor Joseph
H. King, Jr., and his article, Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving
Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences. Id. at 460 (citing King, Causation, Valuation,
and Chance, supra note 40, at 1372-84). Another possible source of the doctrine is the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965). Id. at 460. The Second Restatement of Torts
states:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another
which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's person or
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i. The Doctrine of Loss of Chance
A typical loss of chance claim arises in a medical malpractice suit
where a patient sues his or her doctor for negligently causing him or her
to lose some chance of surviving an illness. 145 For example, a patient
visits his or her doctor, who fails to immediately diagnose him or her
with cancer. If the patient had been diagnosed immediately, then he or
she would have had a 40% chance of survival; however, he or she has
only a 20% chance of survival by the time he or she is correctly
diagnosed. In many jurisdictions the patient can sue the doctor for the
20% reduction in his or her chance of survival. 146  Compensation for
things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to
exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise such
care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) the harm is suffered because of the other's
reliance upon the undertaking.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965); see also infra Part II.B.2.b.i (giving a general
description of the loss of chance doctrine); infra Part II.B.2.b.ii (describing the development and
application of the loss of chance doctrine in Illinois). See generally Nichols, supra note 48, at
626-28; Perkins, supra, at 453-54 (giving good synopses of the history and development of loss
of chance).
145. Julie A. Braun & Maria Elyse Rabar, Recent Developments in Medicine and Law, 36
TORT & INS. L.J. 463, 484-85 (2001); Nichols, supra note 48, at 626-28; Perkins, supra note
144, at 453-54. States vary in their application of the loss of chance doctrine:
[Lloss of chance has been applied to a number of situations, including where (1) an
already ill patient suffers a complete elimination of an insubstantial or substantial
probability of recovery from a life-threatening disease or condition; (2) a patient
survives, but has suffered a reduced chance for a better result or for complete recovery;
and (3) a person incurs an increased risk of future harm, but has no current illness or
injury.
Id. Although most states allow a claim for loss of chance only when the ultimate injury is death,
some allow for loss of chance for an injury. See, e.g., Holton v. Mem'l Hosp., 679 N.E.2d 1202
(Ill. 1997) (allowing loss of chance recovery for a non-fatal injury); see also Hodson, supra note
35, § 7, at 10 (discussing the different standards that jurisdictions apply to a claim for loss of
chance).
146. See Margaret T. Mangan, Comment, Loss of Chance Doctrine: A Small Price to Pay for
Human Life, 42 S.D. L. REV. 279, 290 n. 117 (1996-1997); Nichols, supra note 48, at 620 n.12.
About half of the United States has adopted or considered some form of loss of chance. These
states include: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Nevada, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See, e.g.,
McBride v. United States, 462 F.2d 72 (9th Cir. 1972) (applying Hawaii law); Schumacher v.
United States, 714 F. Supp. 154 (M.D.N.C. 1988) (applying North Carolina law); James v. United
States, 483 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (applying California law); Murdoch v. Thomas, 404
So. 2d 580 (Ala. 1981); Thompson v. Sun City Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 688 P.2d 605 (Ariz. 1984);
Blackmon v. Langley, 737 S.W.2d 455 (Ark. 1987); Sharp v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Colo.,
710 P.2d 1153 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985); Richmond County Hosp. Auth. v. Dickerson, 356 S.E.2d
548 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987); Holton v. Mem'l Hosp., 679 N.E.2d 1202 (11. 1997); Mayhue v.
Sparkman, 627 N.E.2d 1354 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), cert. granted, 653 N.E.2d 1384 (Ind. 1995);
Wendland v. Sparks, 574 N.W.2d 327 (Iowa 1998); Robertson v. Counselman, 686 P.2d 149
(Kan. 1984); Hastings v. Baton Rouge Gen. Hosp., 498 So. 2d 713 (La. 1986); Wollen v. DePaul
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this reduction in chance is calculated by multiplying the lost chance (in
this case 20%) by the full amount of the resulting injury (usually, this
amount is the "worth" of the patient's life). 14 7 As an example, assume
that the patient's life is "worth" $100,000 according to a jury. 148  The
Health Ctr., 828 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. 1992); Perez v. Las Vegas Med. Ctr., 805 P.2d 589 (Nev.
1991); Aasheim v. Humberger, 695 P.2d 824 (Mont. 1985); Lanzet v. Greenburg, 594 A.2d 1309
(N.J. 1991); Kallenberg v. Beth Israel Hosp., 357 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1974); McKellips v. Saint
Francis Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467 (Okla. 1987); Harris v. Kissling, 721 P.2d 838 (Or. Ct. App.
1986); Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280 (Pa. 1978); Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 664
P.2d 474 (Wash. 1983); Catlett v. MacQueen, 375 S.E.2d 184 (W. Va. 1988); Ehlinger by
Ehlinger v. Sipes, 454 N.W.2d 754 (Wis. 1990). But see Frank M. McClellan, Tort Liability of
Physicians, Hospitals, and Other Health Care Providers, SG095 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 29, 47-48 (2002)
(citing Chudson v. Ratra, 548 A.2d 172 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988)). "To date, Maryland has
declined both to recognize 'loss of chance' as a discrete injury for which an independent tort
action will lie or to allow recovery, even within the traditional framework of
negligence/proximate cause for destruction of a chance that is less than 'better-than-even."' Id.
147. See Darrell L. Keith, Loss of Chance: A Modern Proportional Approach to Damages in
Texas, 44 BAYLOR L. REV. 759, 763-74 (1992) (explaining in detail the calculation for
determining damages under loss of chance).
148. See, e.g., Illinois Supreme Court Committee on Jury Instructions in Civil Cases, ILLINOIS
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL, No. 31.04 (4th ed. 2000). The worth of a person's life is
determined after the jury weighs several factors. For example, in an Illinois wrongful death suit
brought by a surviving spouse, the jury is instructed to determine the "worth" of the decedent's
life in the following way:
If you decide for the plaintiff on the question of liability, you must then fix the
amount of money which will reasonably and fairly compensate the
of the decedent for the pecuniary loss proved by
widow and/or lineal next of kin, e.g., son
the evidence to have resulted to from the death of the
widow and/or lineal next of kin, e.g., son
decedent. "Pecuniary loss" may include loss of money, benefits, goods, services, [and]
society [and sexual relations]. Where a decedent leaves
I the law recognizes a presumption that
widow and/or lineal next of kin, e.g., son
has sustained some substantial pecuniary loss by
widow and/or lineal next of kin, e.g., son
reason of the death. The weight to be given this presumption is for you to decide from
the evidence in this case. In determining pecuniary loss, you may consider what the
evidence shows concerning the following:
[I. What (money,) (benefits,) (goods,) (and) (services) the decedent customarily
contributed in the past;]
[2. What (money,) (benefits,) (goods,) (and) (services) the decedent was likely to
have contributed in the future;]
[3. Decedent's personal expenses (and other deductions);]
[4. What instruction, moral training, and superinten-dence of education the decedent
might reasonably have been expected to give his child had he lived;]
[5. His age;]
[6. His sex;]
[7. His health;]
[8. His habits of (industry,) (sobriety,) (and) (thrift);]
[9. His occupational abilities;]
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patient would receive 20% of $100,000, or $20,000, for his or her "lost
chance" of surviving the illness. 149 Many jurisdictions apply a two-part
test to lost chance cases: the patient must first prove that he or she lost a
chance of a more favorable outcome, and second, that this lost chance
was more than likely attributable to the defendant. 150 Typically, loss of
chance only applies in cases where the patient's chance of surviving
before the negligence was less than 50%.151 In jurisdictions that still
adopt the all-or-nothing rule but also allow for a loss of chance claim,
the all-or-nothing rule applies if the chance of survival before
negligence is greater than 50%, often allowing the patient to fully
recover. 152
ii. Loss of Chance in Illinois
After much uncertainty in the appellate courts, 153 the Illinois
Supreme Court formally adopted the loss of chance doctrine in Holton
[10. The marital relationship that existed between __ and __ J;]
widow decedent
[11. The relationship between and ]
lineal next of kin, e.g., son decedent
[__ is not entitled to damages for loss of _ 's society and sexual
widow decedent
relations after _]
date of widow's remarriage.
Id.
149. Nichols, supra note 48, at 626-28; Perkins, supra note 144, at 452. This valuation
scheme is most often attributed to Professor Joseph H. King, Jr., and his article, Causation,
Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future
Consequences. Perkins, supra note 144, at 460 (citing King, Causation, Valuation, and Chance,
supra note 40, at 1372-84). King, however, relies in part on section 9"12(e) of the Second
Restatement of Torts. Id. "When an injured person seeks to recover for harms that may result in
the future, he is entitled to damages based upon the probability that harm of one sort or another
will ensue and upon its probable seriousness if it should ensue." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 912(e) (1965).
150. See, e.g., Jorgenson v. Vener, 616 N.W.2d 366, 370-71 (S.D. 2000) (discussing the two-
part test and Professor King's commentary).
151. Perkins, supra note 144, at 451 (discussing the difficulty in proving medical malpractice
when chance of recovery is already low before the negligent act). See generally King,
"Reduction of Likelihood," supra note 40, at 538 (discussing a case where a lung cancer victim
only had to show he had lost some chance of survival).
152. See, e.g., Estate of Donnini v. Ouano, 810 P.2d 1163 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that
loss of chance could only be applied to less than 50% probability cases). If more than 50%, the
all-or-nothing rule should be applied. Id. See generally William E. Westerbeke & Stephen R.
McAllister, Survey of Kansas Tort Law, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 1037, 1103 (2001) (discussing
Estate of Donnini and the loss of chance doctrine).
153. See Holton v. Mem'l Hosp., 679 N.E.2d 1202, 1203-04 (I11. 1997) ("In this appeal we
are asked to resolve whether application of the 'loss of chance' doctrine in medical malpractice
cases lessens the plaintiffs burden of proving proximate cause. This question has caused
conflicting opinions among the Illinois appellate court panels."). Borowski v. Von Solbrig, 328
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v. Memorial Hospital.154 In Holton, the Illinois Supreme Court allowed
the plaintiff to recover for her loss of chance of recovering from a spinal
infection that led to her paralysis. 155  She alleged that due to the
doctor's negligent failure to diagnose her condition right away, she lost
any chance she might have had of fully recovering. 156 In its opinion,
the Holton court applied the loss of chance doctrine despite the
defendant's contention that loss of chance gives rise to a relaxed
standard of proximate cause. 157 The court, relying on a controversial
Illinois Supreme Court opinion, Borowski v. Von Solbrig,158 reasoned
that in order to prove loss of chance, the plaintiff need only prove
regular negligence, not that a better result would have been achieved
absent the alleged negligence. 159
c. Increased Risk as the Injury Itself
The most recent cause of action created by courts in an attempt to
avoid the all-or-nothing rule is the "increased risk" doctrine. 160 This
N.E.2d 301 (111. 1975), caused much of this uncertainty. See Jennifer Deitchman, Note, Meck v.
Paramedic Services of Illinois: Proximate Cause and the Lost Chance Doctrine in Illinois, II
LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 241, 242 & n.l (1999). After restating the all-or-nothing rule, the
court in Borowski stated that "lilt is unnecessary to extend the burden-of-proof requirements of a
medical malpractice case beyond those of an ordinary negligence case by adding the further
requirement that the plaintiff prove a better result would have been achieved absent the alleged
negligence of the doctor." Borowski, 328 N.E.2d at 305. See generally Hodson, supra note 35. at
§ 7b (discussing the history of loss of chance in Illinois before it was formally adopted).
154. Holton, 679 N.E.2d at 1203-04; see also Christopher White, Survey of Illinois Law:
Medical Malpractice Law, 24 S. ILL. U. L.J. 935, 957-58 (2000) (discussing the adoption of the
lost chance doctrine).
155. Holton, 679 N.E.2d at 1204-07, 1213.
156. Id. at 1204-07. It is interesting to note that Illinois allowed recovery under the loss of
chance doctrine for an injury other than death. See supra note 145 (citing the Illinois case that
adopted the loss of chance doctrine in Illinois).
157. Holton, 679 N.E.2d at 1207; see also supra note 51 (defining proximate causation).
158. Borowski v. Von Solbrig, 328 N.E.2d 301 (111. 1975); see also supra note 153
(discussing the Borowski decision and explaining why it was so controversial).
159. Holton, 679 N.E.2d at 1207.
160. See, e.g., Dillon v. Evanston Hosp., 771 N.E.2d 357 (I11. 2002). Because this doctrine is
relatively new, there is not a consensus as to what it should be called. To avoid confusion,
however, this Note will refer to it simply as "increased risk" because it was so called in Dillon.
Id. at 361. For example, some scholars have proposed theories for the recovery of increased risk
that are basically the same as the increased risk doctrine in Dillon, but those scholars have given
their theories different names. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 54, at 1184 (advocating an increased
risk theory known as the "Proportional Liability Model"). Andrew Klein advocates for a
"Proportional Liability Model," originally proposed by Glen 0. Robinson in Probabilistic
Causation and Compensation for Tortious Risk, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 779, 787 (1985), which is
fundamentally the same theory as increased risk. Id. at 1176 n.16. Many states have at some
point allowed for the recovery for an increased risk when the probability of occurrence is less
than 50%, though few have officially rejected the all-or-nothing rule in favor of the increased risk
doctrine. The following jurisdictions have at some point allowed recovery for a less than 50%
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doctrine represents the most drastic departure from the all-or-nothing
rule; it is basically a full rejection of the old "more likely than not"
theory of causation. 16 1  Under the increased risk cause of action, a
plaintiff may recover for the risk of a future injury, no matter what the
probability of its occurrence, because the increased risk itself is
considered an injury. 162 This means that regardless of whether the risk
is 5% or 70%, under the increased risk doctrine, a plaintiff can recover
for the risk itself.163  Of course, the plaintiff must still prove that the
defendant caused that increased risk. 164  Like the loss of chance
doctrine, the risk is considered only under the damages analysis, where
the probability of the future injury occurring is multiplied by the full
probable risk: California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. See, e.g., Martin v. City of
New Orleans, 678 F.2d 1321, 1324 (5th Cir. 1982); Valori v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No.
CIV.A.82-2686, 1985 WL 6074 (D.N.J. Dec. 11, 1985); Starlings v. Ski Roundtop Corp., 493 F.
Supp. 507, 510 (M.D. Pa. 1980); McCall v. United States, 206 F. Supp. 421, 426 (E.D. Va. 1962);
Coover v. Painless Parker Dentist, 286 P. 1048 (Cal. Ct. App. 1930); Petriello v. Kalman, 576
A.2d 474 (Conn. 1990); United States v. Anderson, 669 A.2d 73 (Del. 1995); Swain v. Curry, 595
So. 2d 168, 172 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 357; DeBurkarte v. Louvar, 393
N.W.2d 131 (Iowa 1986); Davis v. Graviss, 672 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1984); Falcon v. Mem'l Hosp.,
462 N.W.2d 44 (Mich. 1990); Wollen v. DePaul Health Ctr., 828 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. 1992); Feist
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 517 P.2d 675 (Or. 1973); see also Legum, supra note 50, at 569-70 &
570 n.22 (listing some of the jurisdictions that have at some point allowed recovery despite a less
than 50% chance of future injury occurring).
161. See Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 370 (rejecting the all-or-nothing rule); see also supra notes 2-
13 (discussing Dillon in further detail); infra Part HI (same).
162. Love, supra note 73, at 809 ("[I]ncreased risk recovery is predicated on the idea that the
defendant has inflicted a personal injury on the plaintiff by increasing her chances of contracting
a disease."); Lapeze, supra note 38, at 265-66 ("By treating the increased risk as an independent
legal harm, damages are based on the notion that the defendant has injured the plaintiff by merely
increasing his or her risk to develop a disease."); see also Heinzerling & Hoffman, supra note 92,
at 73 ("[C]ourts are, for the first time, recognizing the protected interest of being free from future
harm, 'devoid of both certainty and existing physical harm.'" (quoting Nancy Levit, Ethereal
Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 136, 157 (1992))).
163. United States v. Anderson, 669 A.2d 73, 75-76 (Del. 1995).
The increased risk doctrine is considerably broader thari the loss of chance doctrine
since the former appears to apply even if the plaintiff has a greater than 50 percent
chance of survival prior to the malpractice. Moreover, the increased risk doctrine might
apply to situations not involving death as the potential outcome.
Id. at 75 (quoting United States v. Cumberbatch, 647 A.2d 1098, 1100 n.3 (Del. 1994)).
164. See Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 370. The Dillon court repeatedly emphasized the need to still
prove proximate causation. Id. Indeed, the proximate cause issue was so important that the
supreme court remanded the case back to the trial court because the trial court's jury instructions
were not explicit enough on this subject. Id. at 372; see also infra Part III.C.2 (discussing the
court's decision to remand the case based on the lack of clarity in the jury instructions on the
topic of causation).
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amount that the injury would be worth were it actually to occur. 165 In
fact, because the increased risk analysis is so similar to the loss of
chance doctrine, some scholars see the former merely as an extension of
the latter. 166
There are, however, two major differences between increased risk
and loss of chance. 167 First, loss of chance is only applied to cases
where the risk of future injury is less than 50%.168 If the risk is proven
to be more than 50%, then the all-or-nothing rule applies and the patient
will recover in full. 169 The increased risk doctrine, on the other hand,
applies no matter how great the risk (5% or 95%, for example); the all-
or-nothing rule never comes into play. 170 Second, loss of chance
traditionally has been restricted to cases where the ultimate injury is
death. 17 1  Conversely, the increased risk doctrine has not been so
restricted, although it currently has not been determined how far it will
be applied. 172
One of the best examples of a court's adoption of the increased risk
doctrine is the Connecticut Supreme Court's decision in Petriello v.
Kalman.173  In Petriello, the plaintiff sued her doctor for medical
malpractice after he pierced her uterus during the removal of a stillborn
fetus, resulting in the removal of one foot of the plaintiff's small
intestine. 174 At trial, the plaintiff's expert witnesses testified that, as a
165. Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 370 ("A plaintiff can obtain compensation for a future injury that is
not reasonably certain to occur, but the compensation would reflect the low probability of
occurrence.").
166. See, e.g., King, "Reduction of Likelihood," supra note 40, at 510 n.64 (noting that some
courts have applied the loss of chance doctrine to future injuries (citing Petriello v. Kalman, 576
A.2d 474 (Conn. 1990); United States v. Anderson, 669 A.2d 73 (Del. 1995))); Lapeze, supra
note 38, at 266 (seeing increased risk as an extension of loss of chance); Tammy J. Meyer & Kyle
A. Lansberry, Recent Development in Indiana Tort Law, 34 IND. L. REV. 1075, 1084 (2001)
(discussing how Indiana has adopted what Meyer and Lansberry call the "loss of chance" or
"increased risk of harm" doctrine); cf. United States v. Anderson, 669 A.2d 73, 75-76 (Del. 1995)
(discussing the differences between loss of chance and increased risk).
167. See Anderson, 669 A.2d at 75-76 (analyzing the differences between increased risk and
loss of chance).
168. Id. at 75.
169. See note 152 and accompanying text (discussing and giving an example of the
implications of the all-or-nothing rule on jurisdictions that have adopted loss of chance).
170. Anderson, 669 A.2d at 75; see also supra note 163 (providing analysis of the differences
between loss of chance and increased risk).
171. Anderson, 669 A.2d at 75; see also supra note 145 (discussing how different jurisdictions
apply the loss of chance doctrine).
172. See infra Part IV (analyzing the possible impact and scope of the increased risk doctrine).
173. Petriello v. Kalman, 576 A.2d 474 (Conn. 1990). The Dillon court relied heavily on the
Petriello decision. See Dillon v. Evanston Hosp., 771 N.E.2d 357, 368-69 (I11. 2002).
174. Petriello, 576 A.2d at 475-78.
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result of the removal of a part of her small intestine, there was an 8-16%
increased risk that the plaintiff would suffer a bowel obstruction in the
future. 17 5  The plaintiff consequently requested damages for the
increased risk of a future bowel obstruction in addition to other alleged
damages. 176
Explicitly overruling several previous Connecticut cases, the
Petriello court held that the plaintiff was entitled to compensation for
the increased risk of future bowel obstruction. 177  The court reasoned
that the increased risk should be seen as a "present" injury for which the
plaintiff should be compensated. 178  In terms of damages, the court
determined that compensation should be given "to the extent that the
future harm is likely to occur."' 1
79
The Petriello court began its analysis by discussing the all-or-nothing
rule, which was the rule in Connecticut at that time. 180  In discussing
that doctrine, the court noted that the all-or-nothing rule meant that a
plaintiff who proved a 51% chance of a future injury could receive full
compensation where a plaintiff who proved only a 49% chance of
occurrence could not recover anything. 181 The court further observed
that the all-or-nothing rule did not recognize that the increased risk of
175. Id. at 477. A bowel obstruction is "a blockage that completely stops or seriously
impairs the passage of intestinal contents." THE MERCK MANUAL (HOME EDITION), § 9, ch.
112 (2002) (emphasis removed) (discussing gastrointestinal emergencies), available at
http://www.merck.compubs/mmanual-home/sec9/l12.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2003). The
obstruction can cause swelling of the intestine above the blockage, or, if the blood supply is cut
off, the obstruction can cause gangrene to develop in the intestine within six hours. Id.
176. Petriello, 576 A.2d at 480.
177. Id. at 483. In so deciding, the Petriello court explicitly overruled other Connecticut cases
that had applied the all-or-nothing rule to increased risk situations, including Healy v. White, 378
A.2d 540 (Conn. 1977), Davis v. P. Gambardella & Son Cheese Corp., 161 A.2d 583 (Conn.
1960), Sheiman v. Sheiman, 121 A.2d 285 (Conn. 1956), and Johnson v. Connecticut Co., 83 A.
530 (Conn. 1912). Id. at 484 n.11.
178. Id. at 483.
When viewed in this manner, the plaintiff was attempting merely to establish the extent
of her present injuries. She should not be burdened with proving that the occurrence of
a future event is more likely than not, when it is a present risk, rather than a future
event for which she claims damages.
Id.
179. Id. at 484; see also supra note 165 and accompanying text (explaining the method of
measuring damages under the increased risk doctrine).
180. Petriello, 576 A.2d at 482-83. The all-or-nothing rule was reaffirmed by a 1977
Connecticut Supreme Court case, Healy v. White, 378 A.2d 540 (Conn. 1977) (allowing a boy to
recover for future occurrence of epilepsy and brain damage because the epilepsy and brain
damage were a probability, not a possibility).
181. Petriello, 576 A.2d at 482-83.
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injury itself constituted a present injury for which a plaintiff could be
compensated. 182
The Petriello court abandoned the all-or-nothing rule, 183 citing four
reasons for its decision. 184  First, the court recognized the potential
over- and under-compensation consequence of the all-or-nothing
rule. 185 The court stated that this consequence was inconsistent with
tort law's goal of "compensating tort victims fairly" for all of the
injuries they had sustained. 186 Conversely, the court recognized that it
was also important to avoid "windfall awards" for injuries that would
never actually happen. 187  Second, the court recognized that because a
plaintiff may only recover once for all injuries stemming from a single
incident, she should have the opportunity to recover, at least partially,
for a present risk that might occur in the future. 188 Third, the court
reasoned that it was simply fairer to compensate the plaintiff at least
partially for her increased risk rather than to ignore the risk
completely. 189  Fourth, the court noted that damages for future
consequences are always uncertain, no matter what the "probability" of
occurrence may be. 190 The court concluded that allowing the plaintiff
partial recovery for the increased risk of a bowel obstruction, based
upon the likelihood of occurrence, was the most equitable and sensible
solution. 191
182. Id. at 482. Many courts, before officially adopting the increased risk doctrine,
circumvented the all-or-nothing rule by describing the risk itself as a "present injury." See, e.g.,
Davis v. Graviss, 672 S.W.2d 928, 931 (Ky. 1984) (upholding an award to a plaintiff for future
complications relating to a car accident); Feist v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 517 P.2d 675, 679 (Or.
1973) (sustaining an award to plaintiff when plaintiffs injury could increase her susceptibility to
meningitis); Schwegel v. Goldberg, 228 A.2d 405, 409 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1967) (upholding award
for increased risk of future epilepsy).
183. Petriello, 576 A.2d at 484.
184. Id. at 482-84.
185. Id. at 482; see supra Part ll.A.2.c (discussing the potential problem of over- and under-
compensation with the applications of the all-or-nothing rule).
186. Petriello, 576 A.2d at 483; see supra Part lI.A.2.b (discussing the potential problems
with the all-or-nothing rule as they relate to traditional tort principles).
187. Petriello, 576 A.2d at 483; see also supra note 88 (giving an example of how "windfall
awards" could occur under the all-or-nothing rule).
188. Petriello, 576 A.2d at 483 ("Our legal system provides no opportunity for a second look
at a damage award so that it may be revised with the benefit of hindsight."); see also supra Part
lI.A.2.e (discussing the problem of resjudicata).
189. Petriello, 576 A.2d at 483; see also supra note 66 (quoting Fiest v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 517 P.2d 675, 680 (Or. 1973), where court held that it was just a "matter of common sense"
to award a plaintiff damages for an increased risk).
190. Petriello, 576 A.2d at 484.
191. See id.
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C. Increased Risk in Illinois
As noted previously, the general standard in Illinois prior to Dillon v.
Evanston Hospital was the all-or-nothing rule. 192  Some Illinois
appellate courts, however, deviated from this rule and allowed recovery
under the doctrine of increased risk. 193 This Part first discusses the
major cases that established the all-or-nothing rule as the standard in
Illinois. 194 Next, this Part discusses the Illinois cases deviating from
that standard, revealing a steady progression toward the full rejection of
the all-or-nothing rule. 195
1. Illinois Establishes the All-or-Nothing Rule
Most scholars recognize the 1909 Illinois Supreme Court case,
Amann v. Chicago Consolidated Traction Co., 19 6 as the first Illinois
case to officially adopt the all-or-nothing rule.197  While Amann is
generally given credit for establishing the all-or-nothing rule, Illinois
courts had established fully the rule's foundation, the reasonable
certainty standard, by the end of the nineteenth century. 198  For
instance, in the 1897 case, Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway v.
Conway,199 the Illinois Supreme Court refused to allow a plaintiff to
recover for an alleged permanent disability unless he could show that
the permanent disability was reasonably certain to result from the
injury. 200 In Conway, a derailed boxcar seriously injured a railroad
192. See supra notes 34-42, and accompanying text (explaining the all-or-nothing rule).
193. See, e.g., Anderson v. Golden, 664 N.E.2d 1137, 1138 (I11. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1996)
(permitting the introduction of testimony concerning plaintiffs increased risk of future harm);
Lindsay v. Appleby, 414 N.E.2d 885, 893 (I11. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1980) (affirming award to
plaintiff for future pain and suffering related to a car accident); Harp v. 111. Cent. Gulf R.R., 370
N.E.2d 826, 830 (I11. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1977) (allowing recovery for risk of future injury).
194. See infra Part II.C.I (discussing the important Illinois cases that established the all-or-
nothing rule).
195. See infra Part II.C.2 (tracing the emergence of the increased risk doctrine in Illinois
courts).
196. Amann v. Chi. Consol. Traction Co., 90 N.E. 673 (I11. 1909), overruled by Dillon v.
Evanston Hosp., 771 N.E.2d 357 (Il1. 2002); see also infra notes 205-11 and accompanying text
(discussing Amann).
197. See Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 366-67 (noting that Amann is recognized as the first Illinois
case to officially adopt the all-or-nothing rule); Jeff L. Lewin, The Genesis and Evolution of
Legal Uncertainty About "Reasonable Medical Certainty," 57 MD. L. REV. 380, 409-10 (1998).
198. Lewin, supra note 197, at 409.
199. Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. v. Conway, 48 N.E. 483, 484 (11. 1897) ("[Plermanent
disability, in order to be a ground for damages, must be one that is reasonably certain to result
from the injury complained of.").
200. Id.
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worker. 20 1  The plaintiff sought compensation for his resulting
disabilities, such as loss of time and unemployment. 20 2  The Illinois
Supreme Court held that showing a disability was only "reasonably
likely" to result from the original injury was not enough. 20 3 Instead, the
court held that a permanent disability, in order to be a ground for
damages, must be an injury that is reasonably certain to result from the
defendant's negligence.20 4
Twelve years later, in Amann, the Illinois Supreme Court used this
reasonable certainty standard to establish the all-or-nothing rule.20 5  In
Amann, a passenger on a streetcar was injured when the streetcar's
conductor allegedly threw him out of the car. 206  It appeared that the
only physical injuries the plaintiff sustained from the fall were abrasions
and a slightly sprained ankle. 207 However, the plaintiff in Amann had,
previous to the streetcar accident, suffered a paralytic stroke that
affected the whole left side of his body. 20 8 At trial, the plaintiff brought
in a medical expert who testified that the abrasions and ankle sprain
"might aggravate" the paralysis.2°9  Upon review, the Illinois Supreme
Court found that the medical expert's testimony should not have been
201. Id. at 483. The plaintiff was an employee of the defendant railroad company, working
from a tower house to operate the train gates. Id. The accident occurred when a boxcar derailed
and struck the tower occupied by the plaintiff, turning it over and causing it to collapse with the
plaintiff inside. Id.
202. Id. at 484.
203. Id. ("In a case of this character it may be laid down as a general rule that the alleged
permanent disability, in order to be a ground for damages, must be one that is reasonably certain
to result from the injury complained of.").
204. Id. In this case, the court found that the jury instructions were adequate to support a
finding that the permanent injury was reasonably certain to be caused by the defendant, mainly
because of this clause of the instruction: "in the assessment of damages, [the jury] must take into
consideration only such elements of claimed damages or injuries as they believe are established
by the evidence in the case."' Id. (citing instructions as provided to the jury); see also supra note
38 (discussing the confusing nature of the term "reasonable certainty").
205. Amann v. Chi. Consol. Traction Co., 90 N.E. 673, 674 (Il1. 1909), overruled by Dillon v.
Evanston Hosp., 771 N.E.2d 357 (I11. 2002). Amann was followed closely by another increased
injury case, Louth v. Chicago Union Traction Co., 91 N.E. 431, 434 (I11. 1910), which reaffirmed
the Amann ruling. Amann and Louth are often viewed together as establishing the all-or-nothing
rule. See Lewin, supra note 197, at 409. In Louth, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed a
judgment for the plaintiff on the grounds that the lower court had incorrectly allowed a physician
to answer a hypothetical question about the possibility that a strangulated hernia might cause
death. Louth, 91 N.E. at 434-35.
206. Amann, 90 N.E. at 673.
207. Id. at 674. The abrasions and ankle sprain occurred on the left side of the plaintiffs
body, the same side as his paralysis. Id.
208. Id. at 673.
209. Id. at 674. This medical expert's testimony was allowed only after the defense objected
several times. Id. In fact, in his testimony, the witness denied being an expert, stating that he was
a physician who had treated the plaintiff several times. Id.
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allowed because "[a] mere possibility, or even a reasonable probability,
that future pain or suffering may be caused by an injury... is not
sufficient to warrant an assessment of damages." 210 The court reasoned
that it would be unjust to require a defendant to pay for future or
speculative damages that were less than reasonably certain to occur.
211
2. Illinois Slowly Deviates from the All-or-Nothing Rule
For years after Amann, the Illinois rule that a future injury could only
be compensated if it was reasonably certain to occur was repeatedly
reaffirmed. 212 In the late 1970s, however, some Illinois appellate courts
started to slowly deviate from this long-time standard.213 This Part
discusses several of the major Illinois cases that deviated from the all-
or-nothing rule.2 14 These cases reject the all-or-nothing rule, often
giving little or no rationale for doing so.2 15 Although the reasoning of
these cases is often unclear, taken together, these cases establish a trend
210. Id. Although the court in Amann distinguished between "reasonable possibility,"
"reasonable probability," and "reasonable certainty," most jurisdictions, including Illinois,
recognize that the test is whether the plaintiff has established a better than 50% chance that he
will sustain the future injury). Id.; see also supra note 38 (discussing the complexity surrounding
the terms of art used to connote "more than 50% likely").
211. Amann, 90 N.E. at 674. "It would be plainly unjust to require a defendant to pay
damages for results that may or may not ensue, and that are merely problematical. To justify a
recovery for future damages the law requires proof of a reasonable certainty that they will be
endured in the future." Id.
212. See, e.g., Stevens v. I11. Cent. R.R., 137 N.E. 859, 863 (I11. 922) (saying that "[m]ere
surmise or conjecture cannot be regarded as proof of an existing fact or of a future condition that
will result"); Lauth v. Chi. Union Traction Co., 91 N.E. 431, 434 (I11. 910) (holding that "[t]o
form a proper basis for recovery ... it is necessary that the consequences relied on must be
reasonably certain to result. They cannot be purely speculative."); Wehmeier v. UNR Ind., 572
N.E.2d 320, 335 (Il1. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1991) (reasoning that "a plaintiff has the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant caused the plaintiff harm or injury;
mere conjecture or speculation is insufficient"); Morrissy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 394 N.E.2d 1369,
1376 (I11. App. Ct. I st Dist. 1979) (noting that "[i]n Illinois, possible future damages in a personal
injury action are not compensable unless reasonably certain to occur").
213. See infra notes 217-66 and accompanying text (discussing the slow deviation from the
all-or-nothing rule).
214. See infra notes 217-66 and accompanying text (describing, in the following order, the
holdings in Harp v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad, 370 N.E.2d 826 (I11. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1977),
Lindsay v. Appleby, 414 N.E.2d 885 (I11. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1980), Anderson v. Golden, 664
N.E.2d 1137 (I11. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1996), and DePass v. United States, 721 F.2d 203 (7th Cir.
1983)).
215. See, e.g., Anderson, 664 N.E.2d at 1139 ("Some courts have allowed compensation for
such increased risks without explaining their rationale." (citing Jeffers v. Weinger, 477 N.E.2d
1270 (I11. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1985); Lindsay, 414 N.E.2d at 885; Harp, 370 N.E.2d at 826)); see
also infra notes 224-31 and accompanying text (discussing the holding in Lindsay, where the
court never mentioned the all-or-nothing rule even though it was applicable to the facts of the
case).
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that eventually leads to a complete rejection of the all-or-nothing rile in
Illinois. 216
The first sign of a deviation came in Harp v. Illinois Central Gulf
Railroad,217 where the Fifth District Appellate Court of Illinois
acknowledged the all-or-nothing rule but then allowed the plaintiff to
recover for a risk that was not reasonably certain to occur.218  The
plaintiff in Harp injured his back while within the scope of his
employment with the defendant. 219  As a result of the accident, he
suffered a bulging disc in his spine, which, a doctor testified, could
rupture if sufficient force were to be exerted upon it. 220 Although the
doctor could not testify that the rupture was reasonably certain to occur,
the doctor did indicate that the disc was reasonably certain to rupture if
sufficient force or trauma were to be exerted upon it.221 The Harp court
held that the plaintiff could recover for this possible rupture because it
was likely to occur if force was exerted on it, and, moreover, the
plaintiff had to avoid strenuous activities. 222 Without further explaining
its deviation from the all-or-nothing rule, the court allowed the plaintiff
to recover for the risk, saying that, among other things, it impaired the
plaintiff's "ability to labor." 223
Another Illinois court diverged from the all-or-nothing rule in
Lindsay v. Appleby. 224  Unlike Harp, the Lindsay court did not
216. See infra note 217-266 and accompanying text (discussing the cases which deviated
from the all-or-nothing rule).
217. Harp v. I11. Cent. Gulf R.R., 370 N.E.2d 826 (I11. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1977).
218. Id. at 829-30.
219. Id. at 827. The plaintiff in Harp hurt his back when he jumped off of a train, upon which
he worked as a brakeman. Id. at 827. When he jumped, he landed on a loose ballast. Id. He
subsequently lost his balance and threw himself away from the train; when he landed on the
ground he felt a snap in his lower back. Id.
220. Id. at 830. The Merck Manual explains the process of how a vertebral disc can bulge and
rupture: "When a disk in the spinal column ruptures, its soft inner material bulges out through a
weak area in the hard outer layer. A ruptured disk causes pain and sometimes damages nerves."
THE MERCK MANUAL (HOME EDITION), § 6, ch. 69 (2002), available at http://www.merck.com/
mrkshared/mmanualhome/illus/69i2.jsp (last visited Apr. 8, 2003).
221. Harp, 370 N.E.2d at 830.
222. Id. "[The] plaintiff is required to bear the risk of the occurrence of the force and to avoid
those activities which could result in trauma or force upon the disc." Id. Although the Harp
court did not deviate directly from the all-or-nothing rule, subsequent Illinois courts have
interpreted the decision to be at best a "loose interpretation" of the reasonable certainty standard.
See DePass v. United States, 721 F.2d 203, 208 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., dissenting)
(discussing the holding in Harp and saying that "where ... the issue was extent of injury, the
,reasonable certainty' formula was invoked but then liberally interpreted to allow an accident
victim to recover damages for the possible future rupture of a disc injured in the accident").
223. Harp, 370 N.E.2d at 830.
224. Lindsay v. Appleby, 414 N.E.2d 885 (I11. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1980).
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acknowledge the all-or-nothing rule, even though it was relevant to the
issue of damages. 225  Instead, the Second District Appellate Court of
Illinois seemed to create its own standard for the recovery for increased
risk.226 In Lindsay, the plaintiff was involved in a car accident caused
by the defendant. 227 Afterwards, she suffered from severe seizures and
manic depression. 228 Although the plaintiff presented no conclusive
evidence that the car accident was the primary cause of her seizures, the
court allowed the plaintiff to recover for the pain and suffering
associated with the seizures, as well as for the increased risk of future
seizures.229  The court, however, neither discussed the likelihood of
those future seizures occurring, nor made any reference to the all-or-
nothing rule.230  It said merely that "[a]n increase in the risk of injury
traceable to the conduct of a defendant is compensable as part of the
recovery for future pain and suffering." 23
1
Perhaps the most direct rejection of the all-or-nothing rule came from
the Third District Appellate Court of Illinois in Anderson v. Golden.
232
In Anderson, the Third District acknowledged the all-or-nothing rule,
explicitly deciding not to follow it.233  The plaintiff in Anderson sued
her doctor for medical malpractice after he failed to properly test a
cancerous growth after removing it from her shoulder. 234 The trial
225. Id. at 891-920.
226. See infra notes 229-31 and accompanying text (discussing the test that the Lindsay court
applied instead of the all-or-nothing rule).
227. Lindsay, 414 N.E.2d at 886-87.
228. Id. at 887-88. Actually, the plaintiff's manic-depression was unrelated to the car
accident, but the manic-depression medicine caused difficulties in treatment for the seizures. Id.
at 890.
229. Id. at 887-88, 891-92. In justifying its decision, the court focused on several other
injuries that were more certain to occur: (1) scarring in the brain (from the car accident) would
cause more extreme, convulsive seizures; (2) the plaintiff would be required, for some time, to
remain under medical observation and on medication; (3) the treatment of seizures would be
complicated by the medication for the plaintiffs manic-depressive condition; and (4) the accident
caused complication of the plaintiff's treatment for manic-depression. Id. at 891.
230. Id. at 891-920.
231. Id. at 891.
232. Anderson v. Golden, 664 N.E.2d 1137 (I11. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1996).
233. Id. at 1139. The Anderson court first concluded that because of cases such as Lindsay v.
Appleby, 414 N.E.2d 885 (I11. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1980), and Harp v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad,
370 N.E.2d 826 (I11. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1977), discussed supra, Illinois law on the subject of
increased risk was unclear. Id.; see also supra notes 217-31 (discussing Lindsay and Harp). It
then noted that case law from other jurisdictions established a trend toward rejecting the all-or-
nothing rule. Anderson, 664 N.E.2d at 1139. The Third District Appellate Court of Illinois then
merely said that "Illinois should follow this trend." Id.
234. Anderson, 664 N.E.2d at 1138-39. Specifically, the complaint alleged that although the
doctor had removed the original growth, he failed to have it tested by a pathologist, which would
have revealed that there was an abnormal condition. Id. at 1138. The growth recurred two years
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court refused to allow medical experts to testify to the heightened
possibility that the plaintiff would have a recurrence of cancer due to
the doctor's negligence. 235 Those experts were prepared to testify that
if the plaintiff had received proper treated initially, then she would have
had only a 5% risk of the recurrence of cancer.236 Due to the doctor's
negligence, however, the experts thought that her chance of recurrence
had increased to 30-40%.237 Despite the fact that the increased risk of
developing cancer was less than 50%, the appellate court reversed the
trial court's decision, holding that the plaintiff could recover for the
increased risk of cancer by treating the increased risk as an element of
present damages. 238
The Anderson court noted that other jurisdictions had begun to
recognize that the increased risk itself should be compensable as a
present injury. 239 The court determined that Illinois should follow that
trend, saying: "The treatment of an increased risk of future injury as a
present injury does not run afoul of the general rule that possible future
damages are not compensable absent evidence that such damages are
reasonably certain to occur."240 The court tried to reconcile its holding
with the all-or-nothing rule, saying that the purpose of the all-or-nothing
rule was to avoid awarding damages based upon speculation or
conjecture. 24 1  The Anderson court reasoned that there was nothing
later; it was at that time that Anderson was diagnosed with dermatofibrosarcoma protuberans, a
cancerous condition that necessitated further surgery. Id.
235. Id. at 1138-39. The medical experts' testimonies were excluded based upon the
defendant's motion in limine to bar the plaintiff from eliciting testimony regarding future
conditions that were less than reasonably certain to occur. Id.
236. Id. at 1138.
237. Id. Although the trial court granted the defendant's motion to exclude the medical
testimony, the court certified this question for review:
Assuming that a plaintiff in a medical negligence action has established that the
negligence of the defendant has to a reasonable degree of certainty caused injury to the
plaintiff, may the plaintiff present evidence to a reasonable degree of certainty that the
plaintiff is at an increased risk of future harm as a result of the injury she has sustained,
even if the increased risk of future harm is less than fifty percent (50%) likely to occur?
Id. at 1139.
238. Id. at 1139.
239. Id. (citing Petriello v. Kalman, 576 A.2d 474 (Conn. 1990); Davis v. Graviss, 672
S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1984); Feist v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 517 P.2d 675 (Or. 1973); Schwegel v.
Goldberg, 228 A.2d 405 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1967)).
240. Id.
241. Id. The Third District Appellate Court reasoned:
An award of damages for an increased risk of future injury is proper only if it can be
shown to a reasonable degree of certainty that the risk was proximately caused by the
defendant's negligence. Therefore, there is no element of speculation or conjecture in
awarding damages for increased risks.
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speculative about awarding a plaintiff damages for a "present" risk of
future damages because the evidence showed that the increased risk was
proximately caused by the defendant's negligence.
242
The last important development in the Illinois trend toward rejection
of the all-or-nothing rule is a strong dissent issued by Judge Posner in
the Seventh Circuit decision of DePass v. United States.243 The facts
should be familiar to the reader, as the hypothetical at the beginning of
this section is adopted from the facts of DePass.244 The plaintiff in
DePass suffered from a leg amputation as a result of an automobile
accident caused by the defendant. 245 Doctors testified at trial that as a
result of the amputation, the plaintiff faced a 44-58% higher than
normal chance of dying from heart disease.246  The Seventh Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision barring recovery based upon the
increased risk of heart disease. 247  The district court found that the
medical testimony and other evidence was too speculative and did not
establish that death from heart disease was reasonably certain to
occur.248  The Seventh Circuit majority affirmed this finding but
qualified its decision by noting that appellate courts are not allowed to
re-evaluate evidence, rather, they may only decide whether the district
court's finding was clearly erroneous. 249  Therefore, the DePass
majority did not reach the issue of whether a 44-58% higher than
normal chance of dying from heart disease qualified as a reasonable
242. Id. The Anderson court reasoned that, despite the less than 50% chance that the cancer
would return, proximate causation was still established:
In the case at bar, Anderson has expert testimony to show that Golden's failure to test
the growth removed from her shoulder proximately caused her to suffer an increased
risk of a recurrence and metastasis. The jury should be allowed to hear this testimony
and to decide whether and to what extent Anderson should be compensated for this
increased risk.
Id. at 1139-40.
243. DePass v. United States, 721 F.2d 203 (7th Cir. 1983). Although a Seventh Circuit
United States Court of Appeals dissent is not binding on the Illinois Supreme Court, the Illinois
Supreme Court appeared to consider Judge Posner's dissent persuasive. See Dillon v. Evanston
Hosp., 771 N.E.2d-357, 368 (Ill. 2002) (citing DePass, 721 F.2d at 208 (Posner, J., dissenting)).
244. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text (providing a hypothetical increased risk
situation taken from the facts of DePass).
245. DePass, 721 F.2d at 203.
246. Id. at 209.
247. Id. at 205. The district court apparently thought that the testimony and other evidence
about the increased risk of heart disease did not establish "the fact of injury by a preponderance."
Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. (citing West v. Schwarz, 182 F.2d 721, 722 (7th Cir. 1950)).
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certainty under the all-or-nothing rule. 250  Judge Posner, in a strong
dissent, disagreed with the majority's decision not to allow recovery for
the increased risk of heart disease. 25
1
Judge Posner first chastised the district court judge for dismissing the
medical expert witness' testimony too quickly.252 He emphasized that
courts must not be too quick to throw away evidence based upon
probabilities since most legal evidence is comprised of probabilities.
253
Further, Judge Posner opined that the risk of dying early is a real injury
and should be compensated.254 In an oft quoted phrase, Judge Posner
said that "[a] tortfeasor should not get off scot-free because instead of
killing his victim outright he inflicts an injury that is likely though not
certain to shorten the victim's life."255  Judge Posner went on to
distinguish between the burden of proof necessary for establishing that
the defendant proximately caused the injury and the proof needed to
establish the extent of his injuries.256 Judge Posner emphasized that, in
the case of increased risk, the plaintiff must show that the defendant
proximately caused the increased risk. 257  Once the plaintiff has
250. Id. at 205-06 ("[W]e do not reach the issue of whether merely placing plaintiff in a class
of persons subject, on the average, to an increased risk of injury is sufficient to establish a
compensable injury under Illinois law.").
251. See id. at 206-10 (Posner, J., dissenting).
252. Id. at 207 (Posner, J., dissenting). "I do not think the judge rejected DePass's medical
evidence because he thought it false (how could he have?) or outweighed by other evidence (there
was no contrary evidence). He appears to have rejected the entire class of evidence-statistical
evidence-illustrated by the medical evidence in this case." Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
253. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting). Posner rebuked the district court judge by saying:
But it seems more likely from his remarks that the district judge thought that all
probabilities are too uncertain to provide a basis for awarding damages. Yet most
knowledge, and almost all legal evidence, is probabilistic. Even the proposition that
DePass will die some day is merely empirical. It is of course highly probable that he
will die but it is not certain in the way it is certain that 103 is 1000 or that I am my
wife's husband-propositions that are true as a matter of definition rather than of
observation. If Dr. Cohen had testified that DePass had heart disease and was therefore
likely to die younger than most men in his age group, he would have been making a
probabilistic statement; and the probabilities that are derived from statistical studies are
no less reliable in general than the probabilities that are derived from direct
observation, from intuition, or from case studies of a single person or event-all
familiar sources of legal evidence.
Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
254. Id. at 208 (Posner, J., dissenting).
255. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
256. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 259-66 and accompanying text
(discussing how Judge Posner expands on what he sees as the difference between establishing
proximate cause and establishing the extent of a plaintiff's injuries by contrasting two increased
injury cases); supra Part II.A.2.a (discussing why opponents of the all-or-nothing rule argue that
causation can still be proven under doctrines like increased risk).
257. DePass, 721 F.2d at 207 (Posner, J., dissenting).
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established that the defendant caused the risk, however, he does not
have a heavy burden in proving the extent of the injury. 258
Finally, Judge Posner distinguished between different types of
increased risk cases, arguing that in some situations, when there is no
present physical injury, the plaintiff should be held to the reasonable
certainty standard. 259  For example, Judge Posner agreed with a First
District Appellate Court of Illinois decision in Morrissy v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 260 an increased risk case that reaffirmed the all-or-nothing rule.261
In Morrissy, the First District refused to allow recovery for the
increased risk of developing cancer due to DES 262 exposure because the
development of cancer was merely possible, not probable. 263 At the
time of the lawsuit, the plaintiff in Morrissy had no present physical
injury, but was merely trying to recover for her increased risk of
developing cancer.264  Judge Posner distinguished Morrissy from
DePass, stating that the plaintiff in Morrissy had not yet suffered a
tangible injury but the plaintiff in DePass was already seriously
injured.265 This injury made a difference, Judge Posner argued, because
the jury in DePass needed to ascertain only the extent of his injury,
whereas the jury in the Morrissy situation needed to decide whether the
defendant proximately caused the increased risk.2 66
258. Id. at 209 (Posner, J., dissenting); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 912
cmt.a (1977) ("It is even more desirable, however, that an injured person not be deprived of
substantial compensation merely because he cannot prove with complete certainty the extent of
harm he has suffered.").
259. DePass, 721 F.2d at 208 (Posner, J., dissenting).
260. Morrissy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 394 N.E.2d 1369 (Il. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1979).
261. DePass, 721 F.2d at 208 (Posner, J., dissenting). The majority recognized that the state
of the law in Illinois was uncertain on the issue of whether or not increased risks of injury were
compensable because of Lindsay v. Appelby, 414 N.E.2d 885 (111. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1980). Id. at
206; see also supra notes 224-31 and accompanying text (discussing Lindsay).
262. See supra note 118 (defining "DES").
263. Morrissy, 394 N.E.2d at 1376.
Plaintiff here... is essentially alleging the existence of latent disease as a present
injury to herself and the proposed classes. The nexus thus suggested between exposure
to DES In utero and the possibility of developing cancer or other injurious conditions
in the future is an insufficient basis upon which to recognize a present injury. In
Illinois, possible future damages in a personal injury action are not compensable unless
reasonably certain to occur.
Id.
264. Id. at 1372.
265. DePass, 721 F.2d at 208 (Posner, J., dissenting).
266. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting). Judge Posner argued that in DePass, the only issue was the
extent of the plaintiff's injury, "an issue on which courts traditionally do not impose a heavy
burden of proof on plaintiffs." Id. This distinction between the increased risk of future injuries
arising from present, tangible injuries and those arising from non-manifested, latent injuries is an
interesting one. Most often, claims for increased risks of disease where there is no manifest
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III. DISCUSSION
The Illinois Supreme Court decided Dillon v. Evanston Hospital on
May 23, 2002.267 In its holding, the court sided with lower courts, such
as Anderson, in pulling away from the traditional all-or-nothing rule.268
Part III of this Note first discusses the facts of the Dillon case.269 This
Part then looks at the lower courts' opinions in Dillon and the
subsequent issues on appeal. 270 Next, this Part describes the Illinois
Supreme Court's holding, first, on the issue of increased risk as a
separate recoverable damage, then on the issue of the lower court's jury
instruction. 27 1  Finally, this Part discusses Chief Justice Harrison's
partial dissent as to the court's holding that the jury instruction was not
explicit enough. 272
A. The Facts
Diane Dillon began treatment for breast cancer in 1989 under the care
of Dr. Stephen Sener at Evanston Hospital. 273 In April 1989, Dr. Sener
inserted a sixteen-centimeter-long catheter into Dillon's chest, just
under her clavicle, in order to aid in administering chemotherapy and
drawing blood.274 A year later, in July 1990, Dr. Sener removed seven
centimeters of the catheter, inadvertently leaving nine centimeters of the
catheter inside Dillon's chest.275 Although doctors took an x-ray of
Dillon's chest in December 1990, they never informed her that a portion
of the catheter remained inside her.276
injury arise in toxic exposure cases. See Lapeze, supra note 38, at 260-65 (discussing the
particular problems that arise in toxic tort cases because of the latent injury); supra note 123 and
accompanying text (defining latent illness and discussing what problems accompany toxic tort
claims). Although there is no clear rule on the issue, courts have been extremely reticent to
award damages in these cases. See infra Part V.A (discussing the uncertain impact of Dillon on
toxic tort cases).
267. Dillon v. Evanston Hosp., 771 N.E.2d 357, 361 (I11. 2002).
268. Id. at 369-70.
269. See infra Part III.A (discussing the facts of Dillon).
270. See infra Part III.B (describing the jury verdict of the trial court and the subsequent
affirmation by the appellate court).
271. See infra Part III.C.1 (discussing the court's holding that increased risk is an injury that
may be compensated, so long as the plaintiff can show proximate cause); Part III.C.2 (discussing
the court's holding that the jury instruction was not explicit enough).
272. See infra Part III.D (summarizing Chief Justice Harrison's dissent).
273. Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 361.
274. Id.; see also supra note 2 (defining "catheter").
275. Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 361. After Dillon learned that part of the catheter was still inside
her, she met with Dr. Sener. Id. Although he could not recall his specific actions in removing the
catheter, he acknowledged that part of the catheter indeed remained inside her, embedded in her
heart. Id.
276. Id.
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In December 1991, a different hospital performed a chest x-ray on
Dillon and discovered that the nine centimeter-long catheter fragment
had migrated to her heart, embedding itself in the right atrium.
277
Dillon consulted several doctors after she learned of the catheter's
existence, including Dr. Sener.278 All but one of those doctors advised
her that removing the catheter would be more dangerous than leaving it
in place. 279 As the majority of physicians she consulted agreed with Dr.
Sener, Dillon decided to leave the catheter fragment in her heart, rather
than face the risk of removal.28°
B. The Jury Verdict and the Defendants' Appeal
Dillon filed a medical malpractice suit against Evanston Hospital, Dr.
Stephen Sener, and others who had a part in either the catheter's
manufacture or its insertion.28 1 At trial, the jury found for the plaintiff
and against Dr. Sener and Evanston Hospital. 282 The jury awarded
Dillon $1.5 million for past pain and suffering, $1.5 million for future
pain and suffering, and $500,000 for the "increased risk of future
injuries." 283
At trial, the medical witnesses testified that the risks associated with
leaving the catheter inside Dillon's chest were infection, perforation of
the heart, arrhythmia, embolization, and further migration of the
catheter fragment. 284  At the time of the trial, Dillon had not yet
277. Id. The x-ray revealed that the tip of the catheter was embedded in the wall of the right
atrium while the rest of the fragment was floating free in Dillon's heart. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. Dr. Sener and other doctors advised Dillon against removing the catheter fragment
because there were several risks involved in such a removal. Id. For instance, all or part of the
fragment could "escape" and go further into her heart, or the removal might cause the heart wall
to tear. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 360-61. Dillon filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Cook County against
defendants Evanston Hospital, Dr. Stephen Sener (the doctor who had inserted and removed the
catheter), Dr. David Lim (who assisted Dr. Sener in the catheter's insertion), Davol, Inc. (the
manufacturer of the catheter), Dr. Ronald Port (radiologist), and Kathy Henderson (nurse). Id.
282. Id. at 361. After the completion of pre-trial proceedings, the trial court entered summary
judgment in favor of Dr. Lim but allowed the case to proceed against all other defendants. Id.
The other named defendants, except Dr. Sener, and Evanston Hospital, were relieved of liability
at the end of the trial. Id.
283. Id. at 361-62. The court notes that Dillon did not seek "compensation for past or future
medical expenses," but just for past and future pain and suffering and the increased risk of future
injuries. Id. at 362.
284. Id. at 366. According to the American Heritage College Dictionary, "arrhythmia" is
"[a]n irregularity in the force or rhythm of the heartbeat," and "embolism" is the "[o]bstruction or
occlusion of a blood vessel by [a mass, such as a blood clot]." AM. HERITAGE C. DIcTIONARY
76, 449 (3d ed. 1997).
2003] The Increased Risk Doctrine Governing Recovery for Future Injury 729
suffered from any of these conditions, although she suffered anxiety
because of the catheter's presence. 285 The medical witnesses made it
clear that not one of these risks was reasonably certain to occur in the
future. 286  The risk of infection, doctors estimated, ranged from
approximately 0-20%.287 The risk of arrhythmia was less than 5% and
the risks of perforation, migration, and embolization were also low.
288
Dr. Sener and Evanston Hospital appealed the jury verdict.289 On
appeal, the defendants primarily contended that the circuit court erred in
giving jury instructions allowing recovery for the increased risk of
future injuries when no evidence presented at trial showed that any
future injury was "reasonably likely to occur." 290 The appellate court,
in an unpublished opinion, affirmed the trial court's instructions and
upheld the jury verdict.291 The defendants then appealed to the Illinois
Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.
292
C. The Illinois Supreme Court Decision
In a monumental opinion written by Justice Freeman, the Illinois
Supreme Court overturned more than ninety years of precedent and
affirmed the appellate court's holding that a plaintiff could recover for
the mere increased risk of future injuries, even if that risk was not
substantial.293 The Illinois Supreme Court held that a plaintiff should
285. Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 366. Although the court notes that Dillon suffered anxiety, Dillon
did not seek recovery for the fear of future injury, a separate cause of action in some states. See
id. at 362, 366 (discussing Dillon's theories of recovery); supra also notes 123-28 and
accompanying text (discussing the cause of action for the fear of future injury).
286. Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 366; see also supra note 38 and accompanying text (providing a
discussion of the "reasonable certainty" standard of proof).
287. Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 366.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 362.
290. Id. at 366. "Reasonably certain to occur" refers to the standard a plaintiff must meet
when discussing an increased risk for future injuries. See supra note 38 and accompanying text
(setting out the reasonable certainty standard of causation).
291. Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 362. The appellate court decision, Dillon v. Evanston Hospital,
No. 1-98-2893 (2001), is unpublished under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23. Id. at 362. See
generally ILL. SUP. CT. R. 23 (2000) (permitting Illinois appellate courts to make a decision
without authoring an opinion).
292. Dillon v. Evanston Hosp., 755 N.E.2d 476 (111. 2001) (granting certiorari).
293. Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 370 (overturning, among others, Amann v. Chic. Consol. Traction
Co., 90 N.E. 673 (Il1. 1909)); see also supra note 36 (listing other Illinois cases that adhered to
the all-or-nothing rule, and were, thus, overturned by Dillon). The defendants actually raised five
separate issues on appeal: (1) that the plaintiffs fifth amended complaint, which added an
allegation that the catheter was inserted negligently, was untimely; (2) that the trial court erred in
instructing the jury on the plaintiff's theory of res ipsa loquitur; (3) that the trial court erred in
allowing the plaintiffs to show a videotape at trial that depicted a bacterial infection in the heart
spreading to the brain; (4) that the trial court erred when it disallowed the defendant from
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be allowed to recover for a risk, no matter how small, but that the
amount awarded for that risk should reflect the probability of its
occurrence. 294  But while it agreed with the trial court as to the proper
standard for recovering for increased risk, the court found that the trial
court's jury instruction did not adequately explain the method for
determining damages. 295  Accordingly, the Illinois Supreme Court
remanded the case back to the trial court solely on the issue of
damages. 296
1. Increased Risk of Future Damages
The court first addressed the issue of increased risk.297 This Part
explains the court's reasoning behind its decision to reject the all-or-
nothing rule and to adopt the increased risk doctrine.
298
a. A Split in the Appellate Courts
The Illinois Supreme Court began by noting that Illinois law has
historically rejected the apportionment of future damages that are not
reasonably certain to occur. 299 The court discussed at great length the
ninety-year-old case establishing this rule, Amann v. Chicago
Consolidated Traction Co., 3°° and that other cases followed it.30 1 The
presenting medical testimony it considered cumulative; and (5) that the trial court erred in
instructing the jury that it could award the plaintiff damages for the increased risk of future
injuries. Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 362-66. The court dismissed the defendants' first four issues
quickly and focused primarily upon the issue of increased risk. Id. at 362-70. In dismissing the
defendants' first four issues on appeal, the court reasoned that even if there was an error in the
trial court, the evidence supported the jury's verdict on other theories pled by the plaintiff and the
issues raised on appeal were therefore inconsequential. Id. at 362-66.
294. Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 370; see also supra note 165 and accompanying text (explaining
how to measure damages according to the increased risk doctrine).
295. Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 372.
296. Id. at 372; see also infra note 334 (noting the amount that Dillon actually received for the
increased risk of injury after the case was settled).
297. Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 366-70.
298. See infra Part IH.C.1.a (discussing the split in the lower courts where some Illinois courts
have firmly adhered to the all-or-nothing rule and others have deviated from it by allowing
recovery for the risk of future injuries not reasonably certain to occur); infra Part III.C.l.b
(summarizing the court's discussion of the all-or-nothing rule); infra Part III.C.1.c (giving the
reasons that the court lists for adoption of the increased risk doctrine).
299. Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 366-67. The court later explained that this standard, "reasonably
certain to occur," has traditionally meant that the plaintiff must prove that a future injury is
greater than 50% likely to occur in order to recover. Id. at 367; see also supra notes 36-40 and
accompanying text (discussing further the reasonable certainty standard).
300. Amann v. Chi. Consol. Traction Co., 90 N.E. 673 (Il. 1909), overruled by Dillon, 771
N.E.2d at 357; see also supra notes 205-11 and accompanying text (describing the holding in
Amann).
2003] The Increased Risk Doctrine Governing Recovery for Future Injury 731
court reiterated the reasoning behind this rule, saying that, when Amann
was decided, it appeared unjust to require a defendant to pay damages
for injuries that may not occur.30 2
The court, however, also noted that since the time of Amann,
uncertainty had arisen in the appellate courts.303 Some Illinois appellate
courts followed the Amann rule 304 while others, like the Third District
Appellate Court in Anderson v. Golden, have rejected it.305  The
appellate courts that have allowed recovery for the increased risk of
future injuries circumvented the Amann rule by reasoning that the risk
itself should be considered a present injury and thus, "compensable as
any other present injury." 306
The court concluded that, because of the split in authority among the
appellate courts over this issue, it was compelled to revisit the issue
after ninety years and reevaluate its holding in Amann.307 It noted that
allowing inconsistent rulings to continue would be unfair to the
plaintiffs and the defendants alike.30
8
301. See Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 366-67. The court also cited Stevens v. Illinois Central
Railroad, 137 N.E. 859 (I11. 1922) (reiterating the Amann rule that future damages may only be
awarded when proven that they will occur by a reasonable certainty). See id. at 367.
302. Id. at 366-67. "'It would be plainly unjust to require a defendant to pay damages for
results that may or may not ensue and that are merely problematical. To justify a recovery for
future damages the law requires proof of a reasonable certainty that they will be endured in the
future."' Id. (quoting Amann, 90 N.E. at 674); see also supra notes 205-11 and accompanying
text (describing the holding and reasoning in Amann).
303. Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 367.
304. Id. The court cited Wehmeier v. UNR Industries, Inc., 572 N.E.2d 320 (I11. App. Ct. 4th
Dist. 1991), as an example of an Illinois court adhering to the Amann rule. See id.; see also infra
notes 385-87 and accompanying text (discussing further the Wehmeier case and its possible
impact).
305. Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 367 (citing Anderson v. Golden, 664 N.E.2d 1137 (I11. App. Ct. 3d
Dist. 1996)); see also supra notes 232-42 (discussing Anderson). The court referred to two other
Illinois cases that have rejected the Amann rule: Jeffers v. Weinger, 477 N.E.2d 1270 (I1I. App.
Ct. 3d Dist. 1985), and Harp v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad, 370 N.E.2d 826 (I11. App. Ct. 5th
Dist. 1977). Id.; see also supra notes 217-23 and accompanying text (discussing Harp).
306. Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 367 (quoting Anderson v. Golden, 664 N.E.2d 1137, 1139 (Ill.
App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1996)). For examples of cases that define the increased risk as the injury itself,
see Petriello v. Kalman, 576 A.2d 474 (Conn. 1990); Davis v. Graviss, 672 S.W.2d 928 (Ky.
1984); Feist v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 517 P.2d 675 (Or. 1973); and Schwegel v. Goldberg, 228
A.2d 405 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1967). For a discussion of categorizing the risk of future injuries as
present injuries, see supra note 182 and accompanying text.
307. Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 368; see also supra notes 205-11 (discussing the holding in
Amann).
308. See Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 372 (stating that it was the court's responsibility to maintain a
"sound-uniform body of precedent.")
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b. Discussion of the Amann Rule
The Illinois Supreme Court began its discussion of future injuries by
noting that the Amann rule is the majority view in the United States.309
To meet the "reasonably certain" standard, courts require plaintiffs to
prove that there is a greater than 50% chance that a future injury will
occur.310 The Illinois Supreme Court first examined the historical
justifications for the majority rule, noting that the primary traditional
justification is that courts of law should base their decisions upon
reasonable possibilities, not mere conjecture and speculation. 311
The court, however, also recognized that the majority view has been
much criticized over the years.3 12 Opponents call the majority view the
"all-or-nothing" rule because if a plaintiff has a 51% chance of an injury
occurring in the future, he or she may recover fully for it, but if there is
only a 49% chance of its occurrence, the plaintiff will receive
nothing. 313 Further, those critics suggested that this all-or-nothing rule
is inconsistent with the goal of compensating tort victims fairly-a
plaintiff with a 51% chance of a future injury might recover a windfall
while the 49% chance plaintiff might be left without remedy. 314
c. Rejection of the All-or-Nothing Rule
The Illinois Supreme Court then announced that these critiques
indicate a trend toward rejecting the majority all-or-nothing rule. 315
Indeed, the court noted that even past Illinois Supreme Court cases had
rejected the all-or-nothing rule in applying the loss of chance
309. Id. at 367.
310. Id. (quoting Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 11, 119 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
For a discussion of the "reasonably certain" standard, see supra notes 38-40 and accompanying
text.
311. Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 367. "'[A] consequence of an injury which is possible, which may
possibly ensue, is a risk which the injured person must bear because the law cannot be
administered so as to do reasonably efficient justice if conjecture and speculation are to be used
as a measure of damages."' Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Budden v. Goldstein, 128 A.2d
730, 734 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1957)).
312. Id. at 368.
313. Id. (citing Petriello v. Kalman, 576 A.2d 474, 482-83 (Conn. 1990)). The court also
cited DePass v. United States, 721 F.2d 203, 208 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J. dissenting), King,
Causation, Valuation, and Chance, supra note 40, 1376-81, and 2 GERALD W. BOSTON, STEIN
ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES § 9:6, at 9-30 (3d ed. 1997). See id. (citing King and Stein as
critics of the all-or-nothing rule); see also supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing this
criticism of the all-or-nothing rule in more depth).
314. Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 368 (citing Petriello, 576 A.2d at 482-83 (Conn. 1990)). Whether
a plaintiff recovers where the chance of future injury equals 50% is unclear.
315. Id.
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doctrine.3 16 The court thus overturned Amann, stating that so long as a
plaintiff can show to a reasonable degree of certainty that a defendant's
conduct created the increased risk, the plaintiff should be able to
recover for that risk, no matter how likely it is to occur in the future. 317
The court gave several justifications for the change in Illinois law. 318
First, it reasoned that because the primary motivation for awarding tort
damages is fairness, Illinois should adopt a system other than the all-or-
nothing rule, a system where compensation more clearly reflects the
chance of a future injury occurring. 319 Second, the court recognized the
problem of single recovery, or res judicata, where a plaintiff only has
one chance to recover for injuries stemming from a single incident.320
The plaintiff therefore has no remedy if complications arise out of past
injuries that, at the time of the trial, appear unlikely to occur. 321
The Illinois Supreme Court next addressed the defendants' argument
that allowing Dillon to recover for her increased risk would be allowing
recovery based upon pure conjecture. 322  The court diffused this
argument, reasoning that because the plaintiff must still prove that the
risk of injury was proximately caused by the defendant's actions, there
was little speculation or conjecture involved.323  Furthermore, the
Dillon court reasoned that the Amann case was decided in a different
era, and that scientific and medical advances now enable courts to
316. Id. at 369-70; see supra Part II.B.2.b (explaining how applying the loss of chance
doctrine is a rejection of the all-or-nothing rule).
We therefore reject the reasoning of cases which hold, as a matter of law, that plaintiffs
may not recover for medical malpractice injuries if they are unable to prove that they
would have enjoyed a greater than 50% chance of survival or recovery absent the
alleged malpractice of the defendant. To hold otherwise would free health care
providers from legal responsibility for even the grossest acts of negligence ......
Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 370 (quoting Holton v. Mem'l Hosp., 679 N.E.2d 1202, 1213 (I11. 1997))
(rejecting the all-or-nothing rule as it pertained to the "lost chance" doctrine); see also supra
notes 154-59 and accompanying text (discussing the holding of Holton).
317. Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 370, But see supra Part II.A.I (discussing the concern over
lowering the standard of causation).
318. Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 368-70; see also supra Part II.A.2 (giving a critical analysis of the
all-or-nothing rule and its possible limitations).
319. Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 368. "[T]he primary motivation of the courts for permitting
damages for such an injury is fairness." 2 JEROME H. NATES & ROBERT CONASON, DAMAGES IN
TORT ACTIONS § 13.02, at 13-8 (2001), quoted in Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 368.
320. Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 368; see supra Part II.A.2.e (discussing res judicata as it relates to
the all-or-nothing rule).
321. See supra Part II.A.2.e (discussing the problem of res judicata).
322. See Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 369; see also supra Part II.A.l.a (discussing the importance of
causation principles to the proponents of the all-or-nothing rule).
323. Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 369; see supra Part lI.A.2.a (describing the main concern with the
all-or-nothing rule-that causation can still be proven in a situation where the increased risk is less
than 50% likely to occur).
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determine more accurately the probability of future injuries than was
possible in the past.324
For these reasons, the court held that a plaintiff could receive
compensation for a future injury, even if there was only a small chance
that it would occur.325  The court, however, stressed again that the
compensation for that future risk should reflect the probability of its
occurrence.
326
2. The Jury Instruction Was Inadequate
The Illinois Supreme Court also held that the jury instruction given
by the trial court on the increased risk of future injuries issue was
inadequate, partly because the trial court had not stressed that "the
compensation would reflect the [low] probability of occurrence." 327 At
trial, the court instructed the jury as follows:
If you decide for the plaintiff on the question of liability, you must
then fix the amount of money which will reasonably and fairly
compensate her for any of the following elements of damages proved
by the evidence to have resulted from the negligence of one or more of
the defendants, taking into consideration the nature, extent, and
duration of that injury:
The increased risk of future injuries. The pain and suffering
experienced and reasonably certain to be experienced in the future as a
result of the injuries.328
The Illinois Supreme Court found that the trial court failed to emphasize
to the jury that (1) the increased risk must be proximately caused by the
defendant and (2) most importantly, that the size of the award should
reflect the probability of occurrence. 329 The Illinois Supreme Court
then cited the Connecticut Jury Instruction for the Compensation for
Increased Risk of Injury,330 which states in part:
The plaintiff claims that he/she has suffered an increased risk of
[alleged future complication] as a result of the defendant's negligence.
The plaintiff is entitled to recover damages for physical harm resulting
from a failure to exercise reasonable care. If the failure to exercise
324. Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 370.
325. Id. at 370; see also supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text (discussing the method of
determining damages under the increased risk doctrine).
326. Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 370.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 366 (citing the lower court's modification of Illinois Supreme Court Committee on
Jury Instructions in Civil Cases, ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL, Nos. 30.05 &
31.04 (3d ed. 1995)).
329. Id. at 371.
330. Id. at 371-72.
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reasonable care increases the risk that such harm will occur in the
future, the plaintiff is entitled to compensation for the increased risk.
In order to award this element of damages, you must find a breach
of duty that was a substantial factor in causing a present injury which
has resulted in an increased risk of future harm. The increased risk
must have a basis in the evidence. Your verdict must not be based on
speculation.
The plaintiff is entitled to compensation to the extent that the future
harm is likely to occur as measured by multiplying the total
compensation to which the plaintiff would be entitled if the harm in
question were certain to occur by the proven probability that the harm
in question will in fact occur. 33 1
Although the Illinois Supreme Court did not mandate that Illinois courts
adopt this instruction verbatim, it concluded that the Connecticut
instruction accurately depicted the law in Illinois.
332
331. CONNECTICUT CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTION FOR THE COMPENSATION FOR INCREASED RISK
OF INJURY, No. 2-40(c) (1990).
332. Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 372. After the Dillon decision, Thomas Fegan, one of the
attorneys for a defendant in Dillon, writing for the Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, proposed the
following jury instruction for this case:
The plaintiff claims that she has suffered an increased risk of future injury due to the
fact that a portion of the catheter remains in her body. The possible risks in the future
are:
(a) Infection;
(b) Perforation of the heart;
(c) Arrhythmia;
(d) Embolization; and
(e) Further migration of the fragment.
In order to award damages, the increased risk must have a basis in the evidence. Your
verdict must not be based on speculation. The plaintiff is entitled to compensation only
to the extent that the "risk" can be given a value in damages as follows:
(1) The total compensation to which the plaintiff would be entitled if the harm in
question were certain to occur.
(a) Infection $_;
(b) Perforation of the heart $;
(c) Arrhythmia $-;
(d) Embolization $_; and
(e) Further migration of the fragment $...
Multiplied by
(2) The proven probability that the harm in question will in fact occur.
(a) Infection __ percent;
(b) perforation of the heart _ percent;
(c) arrhythmia - percent;
(d) embolization _ percent; and
(e) further migration of the fragment - percent;
Equals:
(3) The amount that will compensate plaintiff for the "risk" of future injury.
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Accordingly, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the trial court on
the issue of the future damages award and remanded the case to the trial
court.33 3 There, a new trial was to be held solely on the element of
future damages. 334
D. Chief Justice Harrison's Partial Dissent
Chief Justice Harrison joined the court in the bulk of its decision but
disagreed that the trial court's jury instructions were inadequate. 335
Chief Justice Harrison reasoned that juries are told at the outset of their
deliberations that in order to award damages the injuries must be
proximately caused by the defendant.336 This requirement is true of all
other damages, even though the court does not specifically repeat the
proximate cause requirement before instructing the jury on other causes
of action. 337  Also, as to the majority's contention that the jury
instructions did not make clear that the damage amount should decrease
as the risk of injury decreased, Chief Justice Harrison argued that this
reasoning is implicit in the word "risk. 338  Therefore, although the
(a) Infection $_;
(b) perforation $ ;
(c) arrhythmia $ ;
(d) embolization $-_; and
(e) further migration of the fragment $.
(4) Total risk of future injuries $-.
Thomas H. Fegan, A Suggestion for 'Risk of Future Injury,' CHI. DAILY L. BULL., July 26, 2002,
at 5, available at Westlaw, 7/26/02 CHIDLB 5.
333. Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 372.
334. Id.; see In Circuit Court, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., July 22, 2002, at 3, available at Westlaw,
7/22/02 CHIDLB 3 (discussing the outcome of Dillon). After the case was remanded, the parties
agreed to settle the case for over $4.3 million. In Circuit Court, supra. This figure included the
original $3.0 million for past and future pain and suffering plus interest, and $125,000 for the
increased risk of future injuries. Id.
335. See Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 373 (Harrison, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Harrison joined
fully in the court's decision as to Parts I (Fifth Amended Complaint: Negligent Insertion), II (Res
Ipsa Loquitur), III (Admission of Videotape), and IV (Exclusion of Cumulative Testimony) of the
decision, but only in part as to Part V (Damages: Increased Risk of Future Injury). Id. Harrison
agreed that Illinois should adopt the increased risk doctrine but disagreed with the majority's
opinion that the jury instructions were inadequate. Id.
336. Id. (Harrison, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Harrison cited the ILLINOIS SUPREME
COURT COMMITTEE ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASES, ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL, No. 1.01(3) (3d 1995), which tells the jury that its verdict "must be based
on evidence and not upon speculation, guess or conjecture." Id. (Harrison, C.J., dissenting).
337. Id. (Harrison, C.J., dissenting).
338. Id. (Harrison, C.J., dissenting). "By definition, risk includes 'the product of the amount
that may be lost and the probability of losing it."' Id. (Harrison, C.J., dissenting) (quoting
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1961 (1986)). The Majority disputed this
argument in its opinion: "[I]t must be remembered that juries are composed of laypersons who are
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dissent agreed with most of the court's opinion, Chief Justice Harrison
disagreed that the case rshould be' retried on the issue of future
damages. 339
IV. ANALYSIS
The Illinois Supreme Court in Dillon correctly held that a plaintiff
should be allowed to recover for her increased risk of future injuries, so
long as she could properly show that the defendant caused that
increased risk.340 Furthermore, the court was correct in remanding the
case to the trial court based upon the lack of clarity in the jury
instructions. 341 This Part will discuss why the court's holding was
correct in its rejection of the all-or-nothing rule. 342 Next, it will discuss
why the court's decision to remand the case back to the lower court was
proper. 343
A. Increased Risk of Future Injury Should be Compensated
An article in the Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, written the day of the
Dillon decision, captured both the plaintiff's and the defendants'
reactions to the court's decision.344 Surprisingly, attorneys on both
sides expressed satisfaction with the ultimate result of Dillon.345  The
plaintiff's attorneys expressed delight that the Illinois Supreme Court
had finally recognized that the increased risk of a future injury should
be compensated "separate and apart from other elements of
damages." 346  The defendants' attorney, Thomas Fegan, likewise
expressed approval of the decision, saying that he was pleased because
it "pulled back" from the trial court's decision, which placed no limit on
the amount that a plaintiff could recover for a future injury. 347
not trained to separate issues and to disregard irrelevant matters. That is the purpose of jury
instructions." Id. at 372 (Harrison, C.J., dissenting).
339, Id. at 373 (Harrison, C.J., dissenting).
340. See supra Part III.C.I.c (stating the majority's holding as to increased risk).
341. See supra Part III.C.2 (stating the majority's holding as to the jury instruction issue).
342. See infra Part IV.A (reasoning that the court was correct in rejecting the all-or-nothing
rule in favor of increased risk).
343. See infra Part IV.B (reasoning that the court was justified in remanding the case back to
the trial court in light of the lack of clarity in the lower court's jury instructions).
344. See John Flynn Rooney, High Court Allows 'Future Injury' Damages, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., May 23, 2002, at 1, available at Westlaw, 5/23/02 CHIDLB 1.
345. See id.
346. Id. (quoting Thomas A. Demetrio of Corboy & Demetrio, P.C., in Chicago). Thomas
Demetrio was one of Diane Dillon's attorneys who represented her in the medical malpractice
suit against Evanston Hospital. Id.
347. Id. (quoting Thomas H. Fegan of Johnson & Bell, P.C., in Chicago). Thomas Fegan was
an attorney for the defendants in Dillon. Id.
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These positive reactions, from two very opposite sides of the issue,
demonstrate the fundamental reason why the Illinois court correctly
decided to abandon the all-or-nothing rule. 348 At its core, the increased
risk doctrine is more equitable for defendants and plaintiffs alike. As
one court stated, it seems "a matter of common sense" that a plaintiff
suffering both a present, tangible injury and an increased risk of future
injury should be compensated more than another plaintiff who only
suffers from that same present injury.349
Even beyond basic notions of fairness, rejection of the all-or-nothing
rule makes legal sense as well. The all-or-nothing rule causes difficulty
when applied in conjunction with long-standing legal principles, such as
res judicata and statutes of limitations.350 While the increased risk
doctrine allows a plaintiff to recover at one time for all of her injuries
caused by the defendant (including risks of future injuries), the all-or-
nothing rule only allows that plaintiff to recover for those injuries that
are reasonably certain to occur. 351 If a previously barred claim for
future injury later becomes recoverable (for instance, if the plaintiff
develops cancer from toxic exposure), it is very possible that the
development of cancer will not be compensated due to established legal
principles like res judicata or statutes of limitations. 352 Practically, even
348. See Dillon v. Evanston Hosp., 771 N.E.2d 357, 368 (I11. 2002) (abandoning the all-or-
nothing rule). "The primary motivation of the courts for permitting damages for such an
[increased risk of] injury is fairness." Id. (quoting 2 NATES & CONASON, supra note 319,
§ 13.02, at 13-8); see also supra notes 346-47 and accompanying text (giving these two "positive
reactions").
349. See Feist v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 517 P.2d 675, 680 (Or. 1973); see also supra note 66
and accompanying text (discussing the holding in Feist).
350. See Heinzerling & Hoffman, supra note 92, at 73 (discussing the negative impact of res
judicata on toxic tort victims if they are unable to recover for a less than probable increased risk);
Spearman, supra note 57, at 401 (describing the problems faced by a plaintiff exposed to HIV
when the jurisdictional statute of limitations will practically bar any claim the plaintiff could
bring once the HIV manifests itself in his or her system); see also supra Part II.A.2.d (describing
how judicially imposed time limits often prevent recovery for plaintiffs when the jurisdiction
follows the all-or-nothing rule); supra Part II.A.2.e (describing how res judicata often bars good
claims when the all-or-nothing rule is the standard for recovering for increased risks).
351. See supra Parts II.A, H.B.2.c (describing the all-or-nothing rule and the increased risk
doctrine).
352. Heinzerling & Hoffman, supra note 92, at 73. Heinzerling & Hoffman note:
[Toxic tort p]laintiffs pursuing this new course [trying to recover for increased risks
under doctrines such as the all-or-nothing rule], however, still run into the same
difficulties inherent in the more traditional causes of action; they must meet the
unrealistically high numerical probability standard and they must time their claim so as
not to run into preclusion and statutes of limitations. In order to limit recovery for
increased risk, the courts fall back onto their traditional causation standards and require
a pure probability, or more likely than not standard of proof. This rule has hugely
arbitrary and inequitable results in the realm of increased risk as, medically speaking,
"the probability of developing a future disease is unlikely to exceed fifty percent."
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if a plaintiff is not legally barred from bringing a future claim,
practically, he may never' be able to sue because the defendant may be
out of the jurisdiction, bankrupt, or deceased.353
It is true that other solutions exist to remedy some of the legal
problems caused by the all-or-nothing rule, such as the discovery rule,
which avoids statutes of limitations problems by allowing a plaintiff to
sue once he or she "discovers" the injury. 354 All of these remedies,
however, address only individual problems caused by the all-or-nothing
rule; in order for these remedies to work in every case of increased risk,
a jurisdiction must adopt all of them. 355 The increased risk doctrine is a
cleaner, simpler, and more equitable way to address the issue of
increased risk; under the doctrine, plaintiffs who face increased risk of
injury may recover, at least partially, every time they can prove that the
defendant proximately caused the complained of risk. 356
Proponents of the all-or-nothing rule argue that the increased risk
doctrine abandons important causation principles. 357 This claim is
unfounded.358 As Judge Posner recognized in his dissent in DePass v.
Id. (quoting Brent Carson, Comment, Increased Risk of Disease from Hazardous Waste: A
Proposal for Judicial Relief, 60 WASH. L. REV. 635, 639 (1985)); see also Klein, supra note 54,
at 1182 (noting that even if jurisdictional statutes of limitations aren't a bar on recovery, "because
the plaintiff may only sue once for the same transaction or occurrence, if he or she sues within the
prescriptive period for the incidental damages due to exposure, res judicata will bar a subsequent
suit for a disease.").
353. See Lapeze, supra note 38, at 251 ("Because of the great lapse in time [between exposure
and developing an actual injury], defendants may become bankrupt, die, or disappear."); see also
supra Part I.A.2.b.ii (discussing the argument that the all-or-nothing rule works against basic tort
principles by not restoring a plaintiff to his or her original condition).
354. See supra Part II.B.1-2 (discussing several new remedies courts have developed in order
to avoid some of the problems with the all-or-nothing rule). Several jurisdictions have adopted
the discovery rule, but more importantly, Congress recently authorized a discovery rule that
applies to all toxic tort victims in every state. See supra note 107 (describing the Congressional
adoption of a national discovery rule, called the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act).
355. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 54, at 1181-82 (discussing how, even if a jurisdiction extends
its statute of limitations, res judicata will still be a bar to recovery for plaintiffs who sue
immediately for present damages even though they may later develop another injury).
356. See supra Part II.B.2.c (describing the doctrine of increased risk and the burden of proof
that the plaintiff must bear).
357. See supra Part II.A.l.a (explaining the rationale behind the all-or-nothing rule and
describing the fear that any deviation from the all-or-nothing rule will lead to lowered standards
of causation); see also Wright, supra note 54, at 578 (arguing that the disappearance of causation
standards from new methods of proportional liability such as the increased risk doctrine "is
neither scientific progress nor a cause for celebration."); Nichols, supra note 48, at 638 ("For all
of its supporters and detractors, the fact remains that [the increased risk doctrine] does, on its
face, alter traditional causation standards.").
358. See supra Part ll.A.2.a (arguing that causation can still be proven in the increased risk
scenario); see also Legum, supra note 50, at 589 (theorizing that the increased risk doctrine "is a
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United States, there is a difference between determining the extent of a
plaintiff's injuries and determining whether or not the defendant
proximately caused those injuries. 359  The increased risk doctrine
respects traditional causation principles by requiring the plaintiff to
prove that the defendant more likely than not caused the increased risk;
only once the defendant is legally responsible is the increased risk
viewed as an injury for which the plaintiff can be compensated. 360
Although in some respects it seems unfair to hold defendants
responsible for a future event that may never occur, it is important to
recognize that this scenario arose under the all-or-nothing rule as well,
except that under that rule, a plaintiff could recover in full for a future
injury that might never happen. 361  In a claim for increased risk,
damages are proportional to the risk that the defendant caused the
plaintiff to suffer.362 Some argue that, viewed as a purely economic
theory, the doctrine of increased risk is like an insurance premium that
protects against the risk of future harm. 3 63 Viewed on a larger scale,
calculation of damages, not a prerequisite in the determination of whether the plaintiff has been
injured in the first instance.").
359. DePass v. United States, 721 F.2d 203, 207 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., dissenting); see
also supra notes 256, 259-66 (discussing Judge Posner's reasoning that there should be a
difference between determining whether the defendant proximately caused the plaintiffs injuries
and what the extent of those injuries actually were).
360. See supra Part II.A.2.a (discussing why critics of the all-or-nothing rule argue that
causation can still be proven); see also King, "Reduction of Likelihood," supra note 40, at 498-
99 (distinguishing proximate cause from causation). King breaks down the elements for a
negligence suit into five categories: duty, breach, but for causation, proximate causation, and
compensable harm. King, "Reduction of Likelihood," supra note 40, at 497-99. King argues
that the increased risk analysis takes place in the last element, only after causation has been
established. Id. at 499.
361. See supra Part II.A.2.c (showing the problems with the all-or-nothing rule in terms of
over- and under-compensation of plaintiffs); see also Ashton, supra note 38, at 1097 (providing a
distressing example of how the all-or-nothing rule could drastically over-compensate plaintiffs).
362. See supra note 165 and accompanying text (explaining the proportionality of damages in
an increased risk claim).
363. See Klein, supra note 54, at 1187-94 (discussing the economic theory behind this type of
recovery). Klein explains the economic good sense of proportional liability in the following way:
One can deflect this criticism [that some plaintiffs who actually develop a disease will
not recover as much as others who do not, merely because their probability was greater
at the time of the lawsuit] ... by viewing proportional recovery not as a partial
payment of potential damages but as the equivalent of insurance premiums to protect
against the risk of future harm. Economists, for example, define the value of an
insurance premium as risk multiplied by expected loss. Following this logic, several
commentators recently have proposed just that-compensating for enhanced risk by
allowing those exposed to toxins to recover insurance premiums designed to cover the
risk of future disease.
Id. at 1188.
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more plaintiffs will accurately recover damages to the extent of their
injury than would plaintiffs under the all-or-nothing rule.364
B. The Jury Instruction Was Unclear
The Illinois Supreme Court was right to remand Dillon because of an
unclear jury instruction. The Dillon court expressed two concerns about
the lower court's jury instruction: first, that it failed to reiterate the
importance of causation and, second, that it did not explain that the size
of the award for future risk should reflect the probability of
occurrence. 365  These are both valid and important concerns and the
court was right to address them. Dillon adopts an entirely new cause of
action, and the Illinois Supreme Court correctly recognized that it has a
duty to clearly lay out the standards for lower courts to follow.
366
Furthermore, despite the dissent's contention that both the causation and
damage issues were "common sense," and a jury would understand
them intuitively, the jury instruction given by the lower court did not
clearly address either causation or the valuation of damages.367
Both of these components, causation and calculation of damages, are
essential for a jury to understand before it applies the new doctrine of
increased risk. First, as proponents of the all-or-nothing rule point out,
proximate causation is one of the bedrocks of tort law.368 Even if the
jury is instructed at other times that the defendant must cause the
plaintiff's injuries, it certainly does not harm the jury to be reminded of
the importance of that principle. Especially because increased risk
calculations can be confusing, the jury should be made aware that the
364. See id. at 1188.
365. Dillon v. Evanston Hosp., 771 N.E.2d 357, 371 (111. 2002); see also supra note 329 and
accompanying text (discussing the Illinois Supreme Court's holding in Dillon regarding the jury
instructions).
366. See Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 372 ("Our responsibility to maintain a sound and uniform body
of precedent likewise requires reversal on the issue [of the jury instruction].").
367. See id. at 373 (Harrison, C.J., dissenting); supra Part III.D (discussing Chief Justice
Harrison's dissent in Dillon); see also supra note 332 (providing a proposed jury instruction on
the element of increased risk that attempts to address these issues).
368. See, e.g., Wehmeier v. UNR Indus., 572 N.E.2d 320, 335 (Il. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1991)
("Under Illinois law, a plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
the defendant caused the plaintiff harm or injury; mere conjecture or speculation is insufficient.");
Budden v. Goldstein, 128 A.2d 730, 734 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1957) ("[A] consequence of an injury
which is possible, which may possibly ensue, is a risk which the injured person must bear because
the law cannot be administered so as to do reasonably efficient justice if conjecture and
speculation are to be used as a measure of damages."), overruled by Botta v. Brunner, 138 A.2d
713 (N.J. 1958).
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plaintiff can recover only if he proves that the defendant actually caused
the increased risk.3 69  -
Clear jury instructions on calculating damages for increased risk are
also essential. 370 Because calculating damages under the increased risk
doctrine can be confusing if the jury is improperly instructed, the jury
should be clearly told that if it finds the defendant is responsible for the
plaintiff's increased risk of injury, then it may award damages in the
amount of the injury's value multiplied by the probability of its
occurrence. 371 Both because the increased risk doctrine is relatively
new and because it is relatively complex, the Illinois Supreme Court
was warranted in remanding Dillon to the lower court on the issue of
future damages. 3
72
V., IMPACT
The most important ramification of the Dillon decision is that it
represents a repudiation of the all-or-nothing rule for increased risk
situations. 373 Therefore, in Illinois, future injuries that are less than
certain to occur will not produce windfall compensation; conversely,
increased risk will not be left uncompensated, as long as the plaintiff
369. See Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 371 ("This instruction fails to instruct the jury on several
important legal requirements, e.g., the increased risk must be based on evidence and not
speculation .... ).
370. See id. ("[Miore importantly, [the instruction must direct that] the size of the award must
reflect the probability of occurrence."). Because there was no Illinois pattern jury instruction for
the doctrine of increased risk, the trial court in Dillon was required to give a non-pattern jury
instruction. Id. According to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 239(a), a nonpattern instruction is
permissible if it is simple, brief, impartial, and nonargumentative. Id.; ILL. SUP. CT. R. 239(a).
371. See supra note 332 (providing a jury instruction proposed by Thomas H. Fegan, one of
the defendants' attorneys in the Dillon case). But see Ardwin E. Boyer, Editorial, 'Dillon' is Too
Complicated, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Aug. 5, 2002, at 1 (criticizing Fegan's jury instruction as
being too complicated, saying that "the proposed math table is so convoluted, few juries will get
it right."). Although there is currently no Illinois pattern jury instruction on the increased risk
doctrine, Judge Varga, of the Circuit Court of Cook County Law Division, approved and used this
jury instruction in a recent Illinois case tried after Dillon:
If you find that the plaintiff is entitled to compensation for the increased risk [of] future
harm, the plaintiff is then entitled to compensation to the extent that the future harm is
likely to occur as measured by multiplying the total compensation to which the
plaintiff would be entitled if the harm in question were certain to occur by the proven
probability that the harm in question will in fact occur. The increased risk must have a
basis in the evidence.
E-mail from Ardwin E. Boyer, Attorney, Newman & Boyer, Ltd. (Feb. 12, 2003) (on file with
author).
372. See supra Part HI.C.2 (discussing the court's rationale behind remanding the case back to
the trial court based upon the jury instructions).
373. See supra Part III.C.I.c (discussing how the court overruled the Amann rule and adopted
increased risk).
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can prove proximate causation. 374 That is, no matter whether a plaintiff
is claiming, for example, a 95% risk of a future injury or a 5% risk, his
damages will always be compensated by multiplying the risk by the
value of the injury if it were to actually occur.375
There are three other areas, however, where the impact of the
increased risk doctrine is more uncertain. First is the impact on toxic
tort recovery.376 Second is the impact on the loss of chance doctrine.377
Third is the practical application of the increased risk doctrine, and the
possible confusion it will cause for juries.378 This Part will briefly
explore the possible implications of the increased risk doctrine on all
three of these areas. 379
A. The Impact of Increased Risk on Toxic Tort Recovery
A fundamental examination of the increased risk theory leads one to
believe that it will impact profoundly the recovery of toxic tort victims.
On its face, it appears that, as long as a plaintiff can prove that a
defendant negligently exposed him or her to a toxic substance that
consequently increased his or her chances of developing injury or
374. See supra Part II.B.2.c (explaining the doctrine of increased risk). But see infra Part V.C
(discussing how, in the practical application of the increased risk doctrine on individual bases, the
doctrine relies on a fiction that increased risk itself is the harm).
375. See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text (explaining how, under the increased risk
doctrine, any risk will be evaluated under the doctrine and compensated accordingly). "The
increased risk doctrine is considerably broader than the loss of chance doctrine since the former
appears to apply even if the plaintiff has a greater than 50 percent chance of survival prior to the
malpractice." United States v. Anderson, 669 A.2d 73, 75 (Del. 1995) (quoting United States v.
Cumberbatch, 647 A.2d 1098, 1100 n.3 (Del. 1994)).
The probability percentage for the occurrence of a particular harm, the risk of which
has been created by the tortfeasor, can be applied to the damages that would be
justified if that harm should be realized. We regard this system of compensation as
preferable to our present practice of denying any recovery for substantial risks of future
harm not satisfying the more likely than not standard. We also believe that such a
system is fairer to a defendant, who should be required to pay damages for a future loss
based upon the statistical probability that such a loss will be sustained rather than upon
the assumption that the loss is a certainty because it is more likely than not. We hold,
therefore, that in a tort action, a plaintiff who has established a breach of duty that was
a substantial factor in causing a present injury which has resulted in an increased risk
of future harm is entitled to compensation to the extent that the future harm is likely to
occur.
Petriello v. Kalman, 576 A.2d 474, 484 (Conn. 1990).
376. See supra Parts H.B.I, l.B.2.a (discussing, in part, the special problems faced by toxic
tort cases).
377. See supra Part II.B.2.c (describing the loss of chance doctrine).
378. Infra Part V.C (discussing potential problems with the application of the increased risk
doctrine).
379. Infra Part V.A-C (discussing the impact of the increased risk doctrine on toxic tort cases,
the loss of chance doctrine, and jury instructions).
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disease, he or she will be able to recover for that increased risk. 380
Courts, however, have been extremely reluctant to award damages to a
plaintiff who, at the time of trial, has no manifestation of injury at all. 381
Indeed, upon examination, it appears that no court in Illinois has ever
awarded a toxic tort plaintiff damages for the risk of future injuries. 382
Recall Judge Posner's dissent in DePass v. United States, where he
distinguished between the DePass plaintiff (suffering from a present
injury as well as a future risk) and a plaintiff in a toxic exposure case
(although suffering no present illness, he had a future risk of cancer). 383
Although Judge Posner advocated for the recognition of "risk" as a
present injury, the plaintiff believed that there was a difference between
pre-manifestation and post-manifestation plaintiffs.384
When the Dillon court discussed the split between those Illinois
appellate courts adhering to the all-or-nothing rule and those disposing
of it, however, the court referred to Wehmeier v. UNR Industries Inc.,385
a toxic exposure case, as an example of a court that adhered to the all-
380. See supra Part II.B.2.c (discussing the theory of increased risk).
381. Ashton, supra note 38, at 1082; Lapeze, supra note 38, at 266 n.123; see DOBBS, supra
note 40, § 30, at 165 (saying that the "threat of future harm, not yet realized, is not enough"); see,
e.g., Schweitzer v. Consol. Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936, 942 (3d Cir. 1985) (refusing recovery for
workers exposed to asbestos, saying that "subclinical injury resulting from exposure to asbestos is
insufficient to constitute the actual loss or damage to a plaintiff's interest required to sustain a
cause of action under generally applicable principles of tort law"); Wilson v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 684 F.2d III (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that a plaintiff exposed to asbestos was
unable to recover until there was a manifestation of injury); Laswell v. Brown, 683 F.2d 261 (8th
Cir. 1982) (refusing recovery by children whose father died of cancer after being exposed to
radiation because allegations of exposure to high risk of disease cannot support a lawsuit for
present injuries).
382. See, e.g., Batko v. Ogilvie, No. 85 CV 7873, 1986 WL 5761, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 9,
1986) (refusing to allow recovery to workers who were exposed to asbestos and had an increased
risk of developing cancer, saying that "[ulntil an injury is manifested, the plaintiffs have no basis
for recovery" (citing Schweitzer, 758 F.2d at 936)); Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324 (Ill.
1990) (refusing to allow recovery to a daughter for her mother's exposure to DES, which
increased the daughter's risk of developing cancer); Morrissy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 394 N.E.2d 1369
(Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1979) (refusing to award damages for the increased risk of developing
cancer after DES exposure).
383. DePass v. United States, 721 F.2d 203, 206 (7th Cir. 1983); see also supra notes 261-66
and accompanying text (discussing the distinction that Justice Posner draws between the plaintiffs
in Wehmeier and DePass).
384. See supra notes 261-66 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Posner's reasoning in
DePass and Morrissy, supporting the difference between pre-manifestation and post-
manifestation plaintiffs). It is interesting to note that in the Dillon decision, the court never made
such a distinction. See Dillon v. Evanston Hosp., 771 N.E.2d 357, 367 (Il. 2002).
385. Wehmeier v. UNR Indus. Inc., 572 N.E.2d 320 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1991) (holding in
part that the court would continue to follow the all-or-nothing rule). In Wehmeier, the court
refused to allow the jury to consider evidence of a worker's increased risk of contracting cancer
because his exposure to asbestos was too speculative and therefore did not establish present,
compensable injury. Id. at 332; see also supra note 45 (quoting language from Wehnieier).
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or-nothing rule. 386 Now that Dillon has rejected the all-or-nothing rule,
does this mean that the increased risk doctrine can be applied to toxic
exposure cases in Illinois? Although it seems unlikely, theoretically,
increased risk should be applied to toxic tort cases because it is a "risk
of future injury" just like any other. 387  Despite the apparently broad
nature of the increased risk doctrine, toxic tort is an area in which the
impact of Dillon remains uncertain.
B. Impact of Increased Risk on the Loss of Chance Doctrine
Although Illinois officially adopted the loss of chance doctrine in
Holton v. Memorial Hospital,388 it is unclear whether this cause of
action will remain after the adoption of increased risk.389 As discussed
earlier, some commentators suggest that increased risk is merely an
extension of loss of chance. 390 Therefore, it is possible that loss of
chance will be subsumed into the new increased risk analysis. This
fusion is a likely result, especially because in loss of chance cases
proportional damages are given only when the lost chance is less than
50% likely to occur; full recovery is given for any lost chance over that
percentage. 39 1 Because the adoption of increased risk does away with
the all-or-nothing rule, it is doubtful that courts will continue to allow
386. See supra note 304 and accompanying text (discussing the Dillon court's comparison
between Illinois courts that had adhered to the all-or-nothing rule and those that did not).
387. See supra Part II.B.2.c (explaining the doctrine of increased risk); see also Love. supra
note 73, at 809-10 (discussing the increased risk situation with reference to toxic tort situations);
Heinzerling & Hoffman, supra note 92, at 73 (same); Lapeze, supra note 38, at 265-66 (same).
388. Holton v. Mem'l Hosp., 679 N.E.2d 1202 (I11. 1997).
389. See supra notes 167-72 and accompanying text (comparing loss of chance to increased
risk); see also United States v. Anderson, 669 A.2d 73, 75-76 (Del. 1995) (comparing the loss of
chance doctrine to the doctrine of increased risk). The Anderson court discussed the wisdom of
adopting one or both of the theories of loss of chance and increased risk:
Since loss of chance and increased risk of harm both rely on similar theoretical
underpinnings, it is necessary to consider them together. For instance, it would not be
coherent to adopt increased risk without also adopting loss of chance. Allowing a cause
of action before the unfavorable result occurs would necessarily imply one after its
occurrence. Loss of chance could be adopted, however, without also adopting
increased risk. This would merely require plaintiffs to wait until the condition occurred
and then sue for loss of chance.
Id.
390. See supra note 166 and accompanying text (listing those scholars who believe that
increased risk is an extension of the loss of chance doctrine); see also Anderson, 669 A.2d at 75
("[L]oss of chance and increased risk of harm both rely on similar theoretical
underpinnings .... ); Lapeze, supra note 38, at 267 (noting that the doctrines of increased risk and
loss of chance are "basically the same").
391. See supra notes 167-72 (discussing the similarities and differences between increased
risk and loss of chance); see also Anderson, 669 A.2d at 75-76 (discussing the differences
between the two doctrines).
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loss of chance claims when they could be analyzed under the increased
risk doctrine.
C. The Practical Application of the Increased Risk Doctrine
One thing that must be recognized about the increased risk doctrine is
that it is compensating plaintiffs for fictive harm, namely the "increased
risk of future injury." 392 While it seems only fair to compensate a
plaintiff who has both pain and suffering and an increased risk for
cancer more than a plaintiff who just has pain and suffering with no
chance of future injuries, the mechanism of allowing upfront
compensation for the risk of a future harm is, on some level,
problematic. When considering the potential for future injuries, the best
litigants are able to do is to give some sort of statistical probability of
the likelihood of harm materializing for any given individual.3 93 This is
to say that in the aggregate, when considering a defined subset of
people, there is a chance that X% of them will endure future injuries.394
With respect to any individual, however, one ultimately will or will not
develop the future injury regardless of the chance of future risk
presented at trial. Therefore, any recovery under the increased risk
doctrine will necessarily either under-compensate or over-compensate
everyone receiving compensation. 395
It is, however, important to realize that the ultimate future injury
itself is not what plaintiffs are being compensated for; plaintiffs, under
the increased risk doctrine, are recovering for a risk of future injury.396
This is to say that the generalized risk is itself the injury that is being
compensated. In most situations, recovering for the risk of a future
injury is better than not recovering at all. Practically, the increased risk
392. See supra note 182 and accompanying text (discussing how the risk itself is viewed as an
injury); see also Petriello v. Kalman, 576 A.2d 474 (Conn. 1990) (describing the increased risk as
"the injury itself'); Davis v. Graviss, 672 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1984) (same); Feist v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 517 P.2d 675 (Or. 1973) (same); and Schwegel v. Goldberg, 228 A.2d 405 (Pa. 1967)
(same).
393. See Part II.B.2.c (describing how to measure damages under the increased risk doctrine).
394. See STEIN, supra note 67, § 9.16, at 9-31 (discussing the determination of damages in
such a situation and stating that "[how much he or she should be compensated, of course,
depends upon what is fair compensation for what has actually been lost: in short, considering all
the odds, what was the value of the lost chance to avoid the future injury").
395. See Part II.B.2.c (describing how to measure damages under the increased risk doctrine).
But see Klein, supra note 54, at 1187-94 (discussing the good sense of proportional liability
under an economic theory).
396. See supra note 182 and accompanying text (discussing how the risk itself is viewed as an
injury); see also Petriello, 576 A.2d 474 (Conn. 1990) (describing the increased risk as the
injury); Davis, 672 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1984) (same); Feist, 517 P.2d 675 (Or. 1973) (same);
Schwegel, 228 A.2d 405 (Pa. 1967) (same).
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doctrine will still allow more plaintiffs to recover damages to the extent
of their injury than the all-or-nothing approach.397 Given the fact that
Illinois does not allow claim-splitting, meaning that a plaintiff is forced
to recover all at once for all injuries stemming from a particular event,
the increased risk doctrine represents a "next-best" solution for those
plaintiffs who have a risk of future injury. 398
Another possible concern in adopting the increased risk doctrine is
that the detailed mathematical equations necessary to determine
damages will confuse juries. 399 The jury must go through three steps in
order to reach an amount: (1) determine what the future injury would be
worth if it actually occurred; (2) figure out the probability that the injury
will actually occur; and (3) multiply the worth of the injury by the
probability of its occurrence. 400 While this problem can most likely be
addressed by a clear jury instruction, 40 1 some trial lawyers have already
expressed concern that, from a policy standpoint, "we don't want jury
instructions to become more complicated than tax returns." 40 2
However, despite the complexity of the computations, the benefits of
the increased risk doctrine seem to far outweigh its possible
inconvenience for juries. In the end, the increased risk doctrine will
more fairly compensate a larger number of people than the all-or-
nothing rule did.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Illinois Supreme Court in Dillon correctly decided that Illinois
should reject the traditional all-or-nothing rule in favor of the increased
risk doctrine of recovery. The all-or-nothing rule, although based upon
valid principles of tort law, created an inequitable result for plaintiffs
and defendants alike. Although jurisdictions have adopted different
397. See 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 486 (2002) ("[C]ourts have stated that only reasonable
certainty is required in proving the fact and cause of an injury, and that the amount of damages-
once their cause and fact have been shown-need not be proved with the same degree of
certainty."); see also supra note 363 (explaining the rationale behind the economic theory of
proportional liability).
398. See supra note Ill (listing those jurisdictions that allow claim splitting and noting that
Illinois does not allow it).
399. See supra notes 162-72 and accompanying text (explaining the method by which
damages are determined under the increased risk doctrine).
400. See supra notes 162-72 and accompanying text (explaining the method by which
damages are determined under the increased risk doctrine).
401. See supra note 332 (providing a proposed jury instruction for the increased risk doctrine
written by the plaintiffs attorney in Dillon); see also supra note 371 (providing a simpler
example of a jury instruction that has actually been used by a court in Illinois).
402. Boyer, supra note 371.
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remedies to fix some of the perceived inequalities of the all-or-nothing
rule, the increased risk doctrine is the easiest way of insuring that a
plaintiff be compensated for all of his or her injuries. Criticism that this
new rule fails to embrace fundamental causation principles is
unfounded; the basis for the increased risk doctrine is that causation
must be proved before a plaintiff may recover for an increased risk. In
sum, the increased risk doctrine is a more just, more realistic method of
determining the worth of a future injury.
